In recent weeks, diplomatic efforts have intensified across West Africa to rebuild dialogue between ECOWAS member states and the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). At the core of these intricate moves lies the security challenge and the imperative to craft common policies that can harmonise actions, eventually leading to pooled resources. To give this emergency diplomacy a fair chance, all parties must follow tacit rules: sidestep the contentious withdrawal of the three AES countries from ECOWAS, bury the resentment from hostile propaganda campaigns launched by AES regimes against certain regional neighbours, and move beyond the geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel that has sparked a cold war between the two blocs. In short, they must silence grudges, overcome tensions and misplaced pride, and tackle the shared priorities of the moment.
Côte d’Ivoire ‘ready to resume cooperation’
One strong signal of this shift came from Côte d’Ivoire’s defence minister, Tene Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he declared his country was “sincerely ready to resume security cooperation” with Mali and Burkina Faso, arguing that “terrorism, as it currently manifests, cannot be defeated by a single state. Collaboration and the pooling of forces are essential.” This obvious truth bears repeating at a time when some decision‑makers warn that the fallout from the Sahel’s security crisis “could become untenable in the medium term” for the entire region.
How will Mali and Burkina Faso answer Côte d’Ivoire’s offer? So far, nothing suggests a collective surge of lucidity among all the actors needed to jointly produce solutions for the stated emergencies. Even if the Malian and Burkinabe leaders acknowledge that breaking with ECOWAS “does not rule out bilateral cooperation”, they will find it hard to suddenly change their stance toward their Ivorian interlocutor. Côte d’Ivoire is regularly accused of harbouring terrorists “financed or sponsored by French imperialism” – a favourite target in the AES’s machinery for creating external, even imaginary, enemies. Though these accusations have never been backed by facts or evidence, they feed the doctrinaire narrative of regimes born from coups that led to the withdrawal from ECOWAS. Still, despite these strained diplomatic relations, Côte d’Ivoire maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose nationals – by the thousands – enjoy refugee status on Ivorian soil.
‘New era’ for Benin and Niger
Benin, also hit by similar accusations, has seen its new president, Romuald Wadagni, take steps toward rapprochement and appeasement with AES countries shortly after his inauguration on 24 May. A special mention goes to Niger, whose common border with Benin has remained closed since the July 2023 coup in Niamey. When all dialogue between the two nations became impossible, the arrival of a new leader in Benin offered an opportunity to end what had turned into a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former President Patrice Talon.
The change at Benin’s helm has thus accelerated the “reconciliation” between these two neighbours. A “meeting of experts” from Niger and Benin was held in Cotonou on 20–21 June to draft the terms of a new partnership, focusing mainly on defence, security and the conditions for reopening the shared border – a decisive factor for resuming economic activity between the two countries. On this last point, the Nigerien delegation emphasised its wish to obtain more information about the alleged presence of “foreign elements” at the Benin–Niger border. This request echoes the stubborn suspicion of Niamey’s military rulers that Benin hosts a “French military base” intended to “destabilise Niger” or “finance terrorism” – an accusation that defies common sense: why would Benin finance terrorism when it is itself a target and a victim? Such statements have become routine in the narrative of AES regimes, which struggle to curb the continuous deterioration of security on their own territories. Their promise to unite military forces against terrorism has never gone beyond speeches. Today, vast areas of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have become grey zones administered by terrorist armed groups, and the ruling juntas cannot contain their expansion or their formidable project.
Now is the time for reconciliation between Niger and Benin. According to Niger’s Interior and Security Minister Mohamed Toumba, “a new era is opening for both countries. By choosing dialogue over confrontation, we have created value for our economies and security for our populations.” The Nigerien and Beninese actors are well aware that behind the security issue lies an equally crucial economic one, in a space where populations share intertwined destinies. As we witness a return to a diplomacy of realism and pragmatism, what is happening between Benin and Niger looks like a textbook case or a pilot event for a reassessed and intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities across the West African common space.
Endogenous responses to the security crisis
Initiatives aimed at “normalising” relations between ECOWAS and AES countries should become even more concrete in the coming months. Besides reactivating the neighbourhood logics that have prevailed in this region for decades, they underscore the urgency of endogenous answers to the security equation. This echoes the recommendations made last year by UN Secretary‑General Antonio Guterres for “a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries”. In December 2025, Russia – a privileged partner of the AES – sent early signals of a diplomatic recalibration by calling for “continued pragmatic and mutually beneficial dialogue between ECOWAS and AES to find common solutions to common challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism”. These remarks indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation – a way of reminding Africans that it is up to them alone to craft the most efficient solutions for their current challenges.
Bilateral relationship protocols are already observed between the AES and countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Togo and Senegal. Despite leaving ECOWAS, the Sahel’s military regimes have retained their membership in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from free movement within the ECOWAS space. In the end, one may wonder about the justification for the AES promoters’ withdrawal from the regional community. The only available answer goes back to the initial dispute: ECOWAS’s condemnation of the coups that took place in AES countries, and above all the refusal of the bloc’s leaders to work toward “restoring constitutional order”. In many respects, the break between the AES and ECOWAS resembles an artful or incomplete divorce.
