Malian tankers trucks drives at the entrance of Boundiali, northern Ivory Coast, on October 30, 2025 on the way to Yamoussoukro and Abidjan to load oil. In northern Ivory Coast, truck drivers prepare to head back to neighbouring Mali, aboard their tanker trucks loaded with fuel and anxiety. One acronym strikes fear into the hearts of all the truck drivers: JNIM, the name of the jihadist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda that decreed two months ago that no more tanker trucks would be allowed to enter Mali from a neighboring country. Since then, hundreds of trucks have been set ablaze, selling fuel from Abidjan or Dakar, and are part of JNIM’s economic jihad strategy, which aims, among other things, to strangle Bamako and the ruling military junta. In 2023, more than half of the petroleum products exported by Côte d’Ivoire were destined for Mali. Malian trucks load up in Yamoussoukro or Abidjan before crossing one of two corridors into the country: the Tengréla corridor or the Pogo corridor, where military escorts take over on the Malian side, all the way to Bamako. An escort can consist of several hundred tankers. But even under escort, convoys are frequently targeted. The most dangerous areas in southern Mali are the Kadiana-Kolondiéba and Loulouni-Sikasso axes. (Photo by Issouf SANOGO / AFP)
JNIM blockade intensifies, disrupting West African trade corridors
Recent terrorist actions in Mali have severely obstructed key commercial routes connecting coastal and Sahelian nations, impacting the broader African economy today.
On April 25, Mali experienced a series of coordinated assaults orchestrated by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA). These operations, which targeted the cities of Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, and the capital, Bamako, resulted in numerous casualties and tragically led to the assassination of Sadio Camara, the Minister of Defense.
In response, Malian authorities launched a robust counter-offensive against the positions held by these groups. The military prosecutor in Bamako also confirmed the apprehension of several suspects, including civilians, active-duty military personnel, and individuals previously discharged from the armed forces.
Just five days following the initial attacks, the JNIM enforced a blockade on the capital, specifically targeting crucial arteries to the west of the country. The complete closure of the road linking Kita to Bamako left hundreds stranded and significantly complicated the delivery of essential food and water supplies.
This siege has severely disrupted commercial flows, bringing all traffic on the Kayes-Bamako route to a standstill. Furthermore, the expansion of this blockade now includes attacks on transport convoys along the Conakry-Bamako corridor, a route previously considered relatively safe, raising concerns across West Africa news outlets.
Since September 2025, the JNIM has systematically targeted fuel convoys on strategic supply routes in western and southern Mali. These escalating attacks are destabilizing critical commercial exchanges and, if they continue to spread, pose a significant threat to the economies of West African nations.
West African countries are intrinsically linked through their trade networks. The ports of coastal states serve as the primary gateways for imports and exports for the landlocked Central Sahelian countries. The vital road corridors connecting these ports to Sahelian capitals and beyond act as essential lifelines, many of which unfortunately traverse zones where the JNIM operates.
The Dakar-Bamako corridor, a strategic artery for both Senegal and Mali, currently appears to be the most severely impacted by the ongoing insecurity in western Mali.
In 2024, Mali stood as Senegal’s top client, accounting for a substantial 26.5% of Senegalese exports, valued at approximately 802.8 billion FCFA (1.42 billion dollars). During the first nine months of 2025, cumulative Senegalese exports to Mali reached an estimated 662 billion FCFA (1.17 billion dollars).
The JNIM’s assaults in western Mali have had a profound impact on trade between the two nations, significantly reducing volumes compared to 2024 levels. Between September and November 2025, the Port of Dakar reported a daily backlog of around 120 containers destined for Mali, resulting in an estimated monthly loss of 15 billion FCFA (26.54 million dollars) for Senegal. By the end of November 2025, over 2,000 containers remained immobilized in Dakar. By February 2026, approximately 4,000 empty containers were stranded in Bamako, as truck drivers feared traversing the perilous return route to Dakar.
This critical situation has drastically curtailed Mali’s supply of petroleum products, refined goods, hydraulic cement, and foodstuffs. It also severely undermines the livelihoods of thousands of drivers, traders, and freight forwarders. Other vital corridors, particularly those linking the ports of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Bénin to the Sahel, face similar escalating risks.
In 2025, Mali maintained its position as Côte d’Ivoire’s leading client within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The Abidjan-Bamako corridor plays a crucial role in supplying Mali with petroleum and food products. By late 2025, approximately 1.47 million tons of goods had transited via this route, which is now increasingly targeted by JNIM attacks in the Sikasso region.
Côte d’Ivoire also stands as Burkina Faso’s primary African supplier, predominantly providing petroleum products, electricity, and fertilizers. Burkina Faso’s imports either originate from or transit through Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. On February 14, seven Ghanaian tomato traders tragically lost their lives during a JNIM attack in Titao, northern Burkina Faso. This harrowing event underscores the severe security risks now present along the road connecting the two countries. Currently, the terrorist threat is most pronounced within Malian territory, prompting authorities to implement several measures. Since November 2025, fuel convoys have received military escorts, enabling the weekly entry of 200 to 300 tanker trucks, a significant decrease from the nearly 1,200 trucks that transited before the attacks began.
The Malian government has signed a memorandum of understanding with Malian petroleum groups to streamline and expedite customs procedures. A fuel rationing system has been implemented to combat the burgeoning black market. Authorities are also exploring options to alleviate pressure on the ports of Dakar and Abidjan by redirecting a portion of commercial traffic to alternative port infrastructures.
Reports emerged of a potential truce between Bamako and jihadist groups until Eid al-Adha, purportedly in exchange for the release of over a hundred prisoners accused of terrorism. However, attacks persisted, and Malian authorities officially refuted these claims.
The assaults on April 25 highlight the limitations of Mali’s predominantly military response to terrorism. While the JNIM and FLA have set aside their differences to execute these large-scale offensives, Sahelian and coastal states continue to struggle in forging robust alliances. This aspect of African politics is critical.
The regional consequences of the JNIM-imposed blockade underscore the urgent need for a joint protection strategy for cross-border commercial corridors. Governments and regional organizations, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the Conseil de l’Entente, the Mano River Union, and UEMOA, must act decisively to prevent the expansion of this phenomenon to other vital road networks.
The collective fight against terrorism could serve as the crucial impetus for a much-needed revitalization of pan-African news and regional cooperation between West Africa’s Sahelian and coastal states.
