An economist offers a candid assessment of Cameroon’s political landscape ahead of the 2027 double elections.
Economist Serge Alain Godong provides an unflinching examination of the political standoff in Cameroon. Employing concepts from “game theory” and the “prisoner’s dilemma,” Godong articulates his perspective on why Maurice Kamto could not secure victory in 2018 and why triumph in the upcoming elections would prove exceptionally challenging.
In a comprehensive analysis, Godong characterizes the current administration as “openly twilight,” suggesting an electorate that consistently gravitates towards the familiarity of the known rather than embracing the uncertainties of promised change. He observes, “The overtly crepuscular nature of the four-decade-old regime in power compels us more than ever to consider the dynamics of consolidation or change at play within the Cameroonian public sphere.”
Godong, an economist with prestigious degrees from Sciences-Po Paris, EHESS, and Paris X, anchors his analysis in the events of 2018. He recalls, “The initial astonishment gradually subsided following the ‘penalty scored,’ which Mr. Maurice Kamto had publicly claimed to be the ‘shooter’ of.” Since then, Paul Biya has been sworn in, the MRC party has been effectively neutralized, and the majority of Cameroonians have “acknowledged the tranquil continuation of his tenure on the comfortable seat of Etoudi.”
Godong’s argument is built upon the foundational principles of “game theory.” He posits two core assumptions: that “humans are fundamentally calculating” and that they “require information” to secure their gains. In this framework, an election transforms into “a specific moment where a particular individual proposes a form of contract for the future to a national community.”
From Godong’s viewpoint, Kamto is unable to present a more credible contract than the one already in place. He asserts that the approximately 8.5 million Cameroonian voters expected to cast ballots next year would only support Mr. Maurice Kamto if they were absolutely certain that he could better safeguard their interests in the coming years than Mr. Paul Biya.
The economist identifies roughly 16 million current “winners” within the system, encompassing civil servants, formal private sector employees, liberal professionals, and their families. He estimates that “these 16 million Cameroonians, who constitute these winners, annually share approximately 1500 billion FCFA.” They benefit directly from public sector payrolls, government contracts, and major infrastructure projects. “It is these Cameroonians and their close associates who will undoubtedly vote for the RDPC and its candidate, fully aware of the implications,” Godong concludes.
This situation leads to the “prisoner’s dilemma”: in the absence of coordinated information and concrete proof of a superior gain model, voters opt for the status quo. Godong explains, “Cameroonians are perfectly aware that the current situation is rather disadvantageous; yet many among them distinctly prefer it to a presumably superior equilibrium position, about which they can say nothing with certainty.”
The analysis then delves into what Godong terms the “Bamiléké problem.” Citing Meredith Terretta, he highlights the distinction between “gung” (territory) and “lepue” (freedom). From this, he suggests, stems an “economic and social Darwinism” often attributed to individuals from the Grassfields region. Consequently, “Mr. Kamto is not perceived through the ordinary lens of a person offering an alternative political proposal […] but rather as a malevolent avatar seeking to execute a diabolical plan.”
Godong describes a “syndrome” distinct from Stockholm syndrome, characterizing it as a system of “eating together”: “everyone is linked to everyone else by some minor illicit scheme; everyone takes from their neighbor.” This model defines “winners as simply those who ‘eat,’ and losers as those who are hungry.”
Godong’s ultimate conclusion is that, regardless of the victor, they “will have no choice but to act swiftly and decisively.” Swift action will be required for redistribution, and decisive action will be needed to make the economy the sole “battleground.” He emphasizes that achieving 6% growth, reducing the deficit, and combating corruption are all “serious and urgent” priorities for the nation’s future and African economy today.
Ultimately, the analyst believes that the political game in Cameroon “will become less and less complacent, less and less rent-seeking.” He asserts that the country requires “a strong and committed Paul Biya” to navigate the post-election period, a critical moment for African politics and West Africa news.
