At Assamaka, the desert outpost where Algeria and Niger meet, a decisive shift has just occurred. The two countries have officially switched on their trans-Saharan fiber optic link — a breakthrough that goes far beyond miles of cable and promises of high-speed internet. This is the moment when years of construction turn into a live digital corridor, reshaping access to international bandwidth, reducing digital dependence, and opening new revenue streams for operators. For Algiers, it is also a bold assertion of strategic influence south of its borders. Yet in a Niger still battling jihadist expansion, protecting this new infrastructure will itself be a major challenge.
Assamaka: a symbol and a live connection point
The location was never accidental.
In Assamaka, within the Agadez region on the Algeria-Niger border, telecommunications ministers from both nations presided over the official launch ceremony on October 6, 2026, marking the activation of the trans-Saharan fiber optic link between the two countries.
This inauguration brings to life years of work under the Trans-Saharan Fiber Optic Backbone (DTS), a regional project listed on the NEPAD agenda and designed to eventually connect Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania.
But the financial history of the project deserves clarity: contrary to what the phrase “Algeria-Niger deal” might suggest, public documents do not show a single bilateral contract providing, for example, for Niamey to pay Algiers tens or hundreds of millions of euros.
The funding is far more complex.
43 Million euros for the Nigerien component
According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Nigerien component of the Trans-Saharan Backbone amounts to approximately 43 million euros.
This envelope finances 1,031 kilometers of fiber optic cable across five major routes, plus a Tier III national data center and an 88-kilometer local loop.
Figures shared by Nigerien authorities go further. In March 2026, the project coordinator indicated overall funding of more than 30 billion CFA francs, including about 16 billion CFA francs in credit, 12.76 billion CFA francs in grants, and 2.17 billion CFA francs in national counterpart funding.
One important confusion must be avoided: the 43 million euros correspond to the Nigerien component of the project, not a sum paid by Niger to Algeria to purchase the link.
AfDB documentation for the multinational project approved in 2016 reveals a financial architecture blending the African Development Fund, European co-financing, and state contributions. The initial multinational project was valued at 62.262 million units of account.
In other words, no public document supports the claim that Algeria “earns” X billions and Niger Y billions from the inauguration.
And that is precisely where the economic investigation begins.
So what does Niger really gain?
The first beneficiary is unquestionably Niger.
As a landlocked country, Niger depends on international connections that must pass through neighboring countries’ infrastructure. The new backbone offers an additional route to the global internet, notably via Algeria.
The benefit is not just the fiber itself: it is access to international capacity.
Algeria holds significant international bandwidth capacity through its submarine cables. Algerian authorities have said for years they want to use this capacity to connect landlocked Sahelian countries.
For Niamey, this potentially means:
- more internet capacity;
- better quality of service;
- reduced dependence on certain existing routes;
- more competition among capacity providers;
- new possibilities for digital public services;
- growth in e-commerce and mobile financial services;
- better connectivity for northern regions.
The project should notably allow Niger to become more connected to Algeria, but also to Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Chad.
The economic promise is therefore considerable. But the amount of savings for the Nigerien state or the additional annual revenue it will collect has not been published at this stage.
This is an essential point to highlight in any serious article.
And what does Algeria stand to gain?
This is where the file becomes geopolitical.
Algeria has not just built infrastructure that stops at its border. For years it has sought to make its territory a digital gateway to the Sahel.
Algiers claims to have already completed about 2,548 kilometers of fiber optic cable on its territory between Algiers and In Guezzam, on the Nigerien border. In 2024, the Algerian ministry even mentioned around 2,600 kilometers completed.
The logic is simple: route Sahelian digital traffic up to Algerian international infrastructure.
For Algeria, this potentially opens a data transit market.
The more Niger — and tomorrow other Sahelian countries — uses Algerian international capacity, the more Algiers’ position as a regional digital hub strengthens.
There is already a concrete sign of this strategy.
In September 2026, Algérie Télécom signed an agreement with Niger Télécom providing for a donation of transmission equipment enabling a link between In Guezzam and Agadez, with an announced initial capacity of 100 gigabits.
This point is revealing: Algiers is no longer content with building its part of the backbone. It also seeks to support the operation and strengthening of Nigerien infrastructure.
The desired return is not necessarily an immediate financial one. It can be commercial, technological, diplomatic, and strategic.
The Algerian bet: becoming the Sahel’s digital gateway
Algiers’ calculation goes far beyond telecommunications.
The Algerian government officially presents the Trans-Saharan Backbone as a way to make Algeria a regional connectivity hub and offers landlocked Sahelian countries the use of its international capacities linked to submarine cables.
This strategy comes amid Algeria’s repositioning in the Sahel.
In March 2026, Algiers and Niamey reaffirmed the strategic nature of their partnership, giving particular priority to security coordination and infrastructure projects linking the two countries: the trans-Saharan road, fiber optic cable, and the trans-Saharan gas pipeline.
The cable is therefore one piece of a much larger puzzle.
For Algiers, strengthening economic and digital ties with Niamey helps consolidate its influence in a region where other powers — Russia, Turkey, Gulf states, China, and Western actors — are also seeking to expand their presence.
Fiber thus becomes an instrument of soft power, but also of economic sovereignty.
The paradox: strategic infrastructure in a high-risk zone
One question that official ceremonies naturally downplay remains: who will protect the fiber?
The route crosses part of Niger where security risks are far from theoretical.
The Agadez region is a strategic space for Niger. Assamaka, on the Algerian border, sees a reinforced military presence. In March 2026, the commander of defense zone No. 2 visited to meet forces deployed in this strategic area.
Recent history also recalls the vulnerability of this border: in June 2021, a joint patrol of police and national guard was attacked near Assamaka, leaving four dead.
But the problem goes far beyond the country’s north.
In 2026, Niger faces growing pressure from two major jihadist organizations: the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP) and JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda. ACLED notably described western Niger as a major theater of confrontation between these two groups.
In June 2026, an attack claimed by JNIM against Niamey’s airport and military base further demonstrated armed groups’ ability to strike sensitive infrastructure, including in the capital.
The risk to the fiber is twofold: sabotage and accidental or intentional network interruption, but also difficulty maintaining infrastructure that crosses long desert distances.
Fiber could also become sovereignty infrastructure
This is probably one of the most underestimated issues.
The Backbone does not only carry Netflix, WhatsApp, or social media. It can support administrative communications, financial services, commercial exchanges, data systems, and digitized public services.
Niger plans to accompany the fiber with a Tier III national data center, designed to strengthen its digital sovereignty.
The more the country digitizes its administration and economy, the more critical this infrastructure becomes.
This means it will have to be protected like a road, a pipeline, or a power line.
And this necessity paradoxically gives a new dimension to security cooperation between Algiers and Niamey. In February 2026, the two countries decided precisely to strengthen control of their border and coordinate strategies against terrorism and cross-border crime.
A new route, but not yet a rent
The big economic question therefore remains open.
How much will Algeria earn each year from Nigerien traffic? How much will Niger save on its connectivity costs? What will be the price of transit for one gigabit over the Algerian link? What share will go to public operators?
For now, available public data does not allow precise answers to these questions.
What can be established, however, is much more solid: Niger benefited from an investment of about 43 million euros for its national component, largely financed by the AfDB and supplemented by a national contribution; Algeria has completed several thousand kilometers of fiber on its own territory; and the two countries have now transformed these two national networks into an operational cross-border digital corridor.
The real “deal” is therefore less a check than an architecture.
For Niamey, it is a partial exit from digital enclosure. For Algiers, it is the possibility of becoming a privileged digital gateway to the Sahel.
But in a space where armed groups still contest states’ territorial control, one final condition will determine the success of this ambition: that the cable remains intact.
For in the Sahara, building fiber is a technical feat. Turning it into profitable, secure, and sustainable infrastructure could be the real challenge of the next decade.
