On April 20, 2026, General Évariste Ndayishimiye embarked on an official “friendship and working” visit to Ouagadougou. At the time, the Burundian head of state held the rotating chairmanship of the African Union (AU).
This diplomatic overture aimed to re-establish dialogue between the continental organization and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This alliance, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is currently led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.
The initiative unfolded against the backdrop of AES member states withdrawing from AU bodies. In this context, the Burundian president traveled to Burkina Faso, a nation under a military coup regime, to commend efforts toward restoring security and stability. The Burkinabe leader had openly declared democracy was no longer a priority.
Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of “dialogue” and “stability,” a deeper solidarity appears to connect these authoritarian regimes, united by their disregard for constitutional limitations.
My doctoral research explores international sanctions (from the European Union and regional bodies) and authoritarian resilience in fragile states, using Burundi as a comparative case study. A dedicated chapter examines other sanctioned nations, including Mali and Niger. Here, I analyze the political resources that Mali and Burundi leverage to withstand external pressures.
A shared authoritarian trajectory
Indeed, a convergence of institutional paths links Burundi to the AES states. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO) and the European Union (EU) following military coups: Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023.
Burundi itself was sanctioned by the EU and the United States in 2016, a direct response to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s pursuit of a third term, widely deemed unconstitutional. Certain political phenomena necessitate a trans-regional comparative approach. This isn’t merely about identifying superficial similarities; it seeks to reveal profound, converging logics at play.
The rapprochement between Burundi and Mali, for instance—two countries separated by thousands of kilometers and operating in distinct geopolitical environments—exemplifies this analytical approach.
The enemy card: a tool for legitimacy
In both instances, the identification of an enemy, whether internal or external, serves as a core mechanism for legitimacy and a powerful driver of internal cohesion. This strategy allows for the constant reactivation of a threat, adapting to political circumstances, be it a colonial adversary, a regional rival, or a diffuse security menace.
In Mali, this mechanism intensified significantly in early 2022. Fueled by a “rally around the flag” effect—a phenomenon where the populace unites behind leaders in the face of an external or perceived threat—the Malian authorities saw their power consolidate. Backed by a civilian component in the second phase of the transition following the May 2021 coup, the military garnered massive popular support.
Tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on Boulevard de l’Indépendance on January 14, 2022, to denounce the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by CEDEAO. They chanted their hostility towards Paris and the regional organization, accusing them of interfering in national affairs. They also demanded a Mali solely for its citizens, free from outside influences.
In Burundi, it is Belgium that became the focal point of anger for supporters of the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Designated as historically responsible for ethnic divisions within the country, the former colonial power is also accused of complicity with Rwanda in attempts to destabilize the current regime.
The Burundian government, led by the CNDD-FDD, portrays Brussels as the instigator of EU economic sanctions—a narrative that allows both regimes to deflect international criticism into a story of resistance against the former colonizer.
Strategic regional adversaries
On the regional front, each regime also selects an adversary. In Mali, Algeria stands accused of harboring opposition figures like Imam Mahmoud Dicko and of connivance with active terrorist groups. The Malian junta announced on January 25, 2024, the “immediate termination” of the Algiers peace agreement. Mali also closed its airspace to Algeria after the latter took a similar measure in April 2025. In Burundi, however, Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, a Tutsi-led regime, plays this role.
Labeled a “bad neighbor” by President Ndayishimiye, Kigali is accused of sheltering the coup plotters involved in the 2015 attempted coup. Burundian authorities also portray Rwanda as a supporter of rebel movements like RED-Tabara, sometimes linked to other armed groups in the region.
This defensive stance led to the closure of land borders with Rwanda in January 2024, as well as active military intervention in eastern DRC between August 2022 and December 2025. There, Burundian forces supported the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), alongside Wazalendo militias (patriots in Kiswahili) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against the M23 Movement, which Kigali reportedly backed.
These symbolic resources are mobilized to maintain a perpetual sense of siege—a necessary condition for the political survival of regimes that have made external threats their primary fuel.
The security paradox
A security paradox, however, exists between the two nations. In Mali, the threat appears more immediate through attacks on April 25, 2026, perpetrated by the FLA and JNIM. These incidents bolster the credibility of the regime’s security narrative.
This divergence in the nature of the threat leads to distinct legitimization strategies.
The head of Mali’s junta, Assimi Goïta, has bypassed electoral constraints. In July 2025, the National Transitional Council granted him a renewable five-year mandate with no elections and no term limits, solidifying a drift that began with earlier postponements of the elections promised for March 2024.
The junta no longer needs to legitimize a vote; instead, it positions itself as the sole bulwark capable of defeating JNIM and FLA. This is despite the Malian economy’s resilience, which remains exposed to recurrent power outages and the gradual withdrawal of development and humanitarian aid.
In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD has designated the incumbent president as its candidate for the 2027 presidential election, and even a tightly controlled ballot remains a mandatory step.
The security record highlighted by Gitega does not, therefore, replace an election; rather, it aims to prepare for it. In this context, the security narrative allows the regime to relegate to the background an economic record marked by fuel and currency shortages that have plagued the country since 2015.
Considering both are among the world’s poorest countries—Burundi ranking last in 2023—does the constant externalization of responsibility through the creation of an enemy also mask, according to French political scientist Jean-François Bayart’s analytical framework, internal dynamics of predation that structure authoritarian regimes?
Ultimately, the Mali-Burundi comparison reveals less about the singularity of each trajectory and more about the robustness of a common logic among regimes that have transformed their enemies not into a burden, but into their very foundation.
