Minister Paul Atanga Nji’s latest book, “Understanding the Meaning of My Permanent Struggle for Respect of Republican Legality,” can be read as a hymn to conservatism, a showcase of his contributions to regime stability, or a tribute to President Paul Biya’s wisdom. But the insightful reader will notice his significant contribution to political science and conflict resolution through the “imperfect equilibrium” theory developed in the book’s postface.
Since 2016, the crisis in Cameroon’s North-West and South-West regions has escalated into armed conflict, with separatist groups demanding an “Ambazonia Republic” secession. The separatist narrative claims systemic marginalization of English-speakers by the French-speaking majority. Atanga Nji challenges this, arguing that the regime’s tangible achievements in the two English-speaking regions, his own position in the state apparatus, and the presence of many other English-speaking leaders in top posts (ministers, directors of strategic public enterprises, key private sector roles) constitute an empirical refutation of separatist claims.
Atanga Nji’s central argument rests on an example-driven demonstration. As an English-speaker integrated at the state’s summit, with a long career in banking and finance, he embodies the proof that alleged marginalization is a politically constructed myth. This argument, which could be called the “successful integration thesis,” fits into a broader symbolic counter-insurgency strategy: the presence of English-speakers at the highest levels and significant public investment in the two regions disprove systemic discrimination.
The postface introduces the “imperfect equilibrium logic” as a guiding principle for managing conflicts, disputes, and negotiations. This theory extends President Paul Biya’s reflection on international peace and security, particularly his 2017 UN General Assembly speech. Atanga Nji elevates this presidential insight to a theoretical paradigm, starting from the observation that “all wars are useless” but distinguishing between legitimate self-defense and war for war’s sake. He argues there is a “legitimate war” against terrorism, justifying force by a legitimate government.
The imperfect equilibrium theory critiques the ideal of perfect compromise. Atanga Nji argues that seeking absolute balance or total distributive justice in negotiations is not only illusory but counterproductive. He writes: “To end all these justified or useless conflicts disturbing humanity’s peace, we must negotiate and compromise. We must accept the middle ground policy, which is not necessarily just because there is never a good compromise. Compromise is not necessarily capitulation, for if belligerents saw compromise as capitulation, armed conflict would never end.”
The author develops his thinking in four structuring propositions:
First proposition: the middle ground is not always just
“Imperfect equilibrium is a balance that is not always just, but allows settling any conflict in a spirit of equity and appeasement. In every negotiation, we must remember the middle ground is not always just, and the balance so sought as a solution to certain conflicts or grievances is not always balanced.” This proposition affirms that procedural equity (reaching a settlement) trumps substantive justice (the settlement’s conformity to a justice ideal). Imperfect equilibrium is functional rather than normative.
Second proposition: compromise as reciprocal renunciation
“The meaning of compromise sometimes involves doing violence to oneself by accepting to lose something very dear to regain peace or resolve a difficult political, economic, or social equation.” Here, the theory positions negotiation as an economy of gift and renunciation, not a bargain where each party gets what they deem just, but a process where each “does violence to oneself” to preserve collective order. This sacrificial dimension aligns Atanga Nji’s thought with hierarchical contractualism rather than Rawlsian egalitarian contractualism.
Third proposition: imperfection as a condition for peace
“Indeed, equilibrium contains imperfections and we must take them into account when facing deadlock in negotiations. As soon as we accept there is never a good compromise, and compromise is not necessarily capitulation but common sense, we will always arrive at the middle ground logic to end all conflicts disturbing humanity’s peace.” This proposition inverts epistemology: far from being a failure, the imperfection of equilibrium enables resolution. Expecting a perfect compromise blocks progress; accepting imperfection opens resolution.
Fourth proposition: universality of the logic
“In negotiations, we must not take too much nor give everything. We must now integrate the imperfect equilibrium logic into international negotiations at all levels of discussion, whatever the subject, so that the world is more peaceful, less selfish, and less dangerous. […] The imperfect equilibrium logic can now be seen as a guide for humanity. It applies at all levels of life.” Atanga Nji thus elevates his theory to a universal governance principle, applicable to international relations and ordinary social interactions.
The theory’s relevance to the Anglophone crisis becomes clear when linking both registers of the author’s thought. According to Atanga Nji, the marginalization thesis arises from an unrealistic expectation of perfect balance: numerical equality (the two Anglophone regions do not represent a quarter of Cameroon’s population or a significant land area justifying strict parity), strict parity (illusory to demand parity solely on colonial language grounds), and institutional symmetry between linguistic communities (dangerous for national cohesion to reason in terms of spoken language when neither official language belongs to Cameroon). Such equilibrium is impossible in a composite society like Cameroon with four cultural areas, and undesirable as it would freeze identities and paralyze political decision-making, compromising the national unity policy pursued by successive governments.
Imperfect equilibrium enables thinking about asymmetric yet peaceful coexistence: English-speakers do not have proportional representation, but they occupy key posts; they do not enjoy pure federalism, but they participate in state leadership. This equity in inequality—to borrow a classic phrase—constitutes, according to the author, the only realistic horizon for Cameroon.
The heuristic power of this theory finely accounts for real political negotiation processes where actors accept suboptimal solutions to preserve social order. It aligns with rational choice theorists’ work on imperfect Nash equilibria, and Jon Elster’s analysis of the rationality of renunciation. It also offers a framework to understand the relative stability of Cameroon’s regime despite structural tensions: President Paul Biya’s managerial expertise lies precisely in managing imperfect equilibria, partially satisfying without ever fully excluding.
The imperfect equilibrium theory represents the most original contribution of Paul Atanga Nji’s book. By asserting that “the middle ground is not always just,” “the balance so sought… is not always balanced,” and peace requires “accepting to lose something very dear,” the author proposes a framework for political negotiation that shifts emphasis from substantive justice to procedural viability.
Paul Atanga Nji’s work is an exceptionally rich political document for researchers in African political science. It offers a window into Cameroonian power discourse in the era of national renewal, the legitimation mechanisms of a regime in constant tension with its margins, and how integrated English-speaking elites negotiate their dual community and state belonging.
