Béninese lawmakers question military option in Niger crisis

Following the military coup d’état that unfolded in Niger on July 26, 2023, international reactions were swift and pronounced. Major bodies such as ECOWAS, the AU, and prominent nations including the USA, France, and Russia, quickly articulated their positions. Within Bénin, the pronouncements from President Patrice Talon and the indications of a potential armed intervention have not been universally welcomed. Reports from Western media suggest Bénin might commit troops alongside ECOWAS to confront the military junta. Many stakeholders, notably the Catholic Church and various political figures, have openly voiced their opposition to a military solution, advocating instead for diplomatic approaches to resolve the crisis.

Elected representatives from the opposition party, « Les Démocrates », have directly challenged the government on this critical situation, submitting a comprehensive set of 19 urgent questions. At the core of their inquiry lies the justification for Bénin’s military involvement, particularly when considering the longstanding fraternal bond between Bénin and Niger. Their concerns extend to the adherence to the Beninese constitution, the safety of any deployed troops, and importantly, the potential for conflict escalation and its far-reaching implications for both the civilian population and Bénin itself.

Beyond military considerations, significant economic and diplomatic anxieties have also been brought to the forefront. The decision to close borders with Niger could lead to substantial repercussions for the Autonomous Port of Cotonou and Bénin’s broader economy, which is already feeling the strain of ECOWAS sanctions. In light of rising prices for essential goods and the adverse effects on economic actors, the opposition demands concrete answers from the government.

Dialogue is emerging as a preferred pathway for numerous regional and international players. The opposition lawmakers have reminded Patrice Talon of his own past statements advocating dialogue as an alternative to coups, urging him to implement such an inclusive dialogue within Bénin. The present moment calls for careful consideration, thorough inquiry, and, above all, the pursuit of peaceful and consensual resolutions for the region’s future.

oral questioning and debate with the government

On July 26, 2023, a military coup d’état took place in Niger, interrupting the constitutional mandate of President Mohamed Bazoum. This event triggered reactions from numerous states globally and from sub-regional and regional organizations, including ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN. On Thursday, August 10, 2023, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS nations convened an extraordinary summit, concluding with decisions that included ordering the deployment of the ECOWAS standby force to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Niger.

In response, the Beninese government, through its various declarations, has committed to deploying Beninese troops as part of the ECOWAS contingent intended to combat the military junta in power. Given this governmental decision to involve the Beninese state in a conflict against the sovereign brotherly people of Niger, a move seen as violating Article 101 of our constitution, and acknowledging that sanctions imposed by the Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State at its July 30, 2023, session in Abuja are already severely impacting our country’s economic, social, and security situation, the national representation, under Article 108 and its various paragraphs of the National Assembly’s internal regulations, invites the government to respond to the following concerns:

1. What measures has the government taken to seek parliamentary approval regarding the deployment of Beninese troops in the ECOWAS theater of operations in Niger, should the threatened military option be implemented, in accordance with Article 101, paragraph 1, of our constitution: « the declaration of war is authorized by the National Assembly »?
2. In anticipation of this potential conflict against the sovereign people of Niger, several countries, such as France and the United States, have made arrangements for the evacuation of their nationals from Niger. What provisions has the Beninese government made for its citizens residing in Niger?
3. Given that Bénin and Niger are brotherly nations, what justifies Bénin’s willingness to send its troops to attack Niger, while other ECOWAS countries not bordering Niger refuse to participate?
4. What is the projected number of Beninese soldiers and the essential logistics the government intends to provide to the ECOWAS contingent? What is the estimated cost of Bénin’s potential participation in this operation? Who will bear this financial burden?
5. In the event of an aggression against the brotherly country of Niger, can our government guarantee that no lives of Nigerien civilians will be affected, nor those of our soldiers?
6. What has the government planned for each soldier in terms of bonuses, and for each soldier’s family in the event of death of Beninese soldiers in the theater of operations?
7. As a country bordering Niger, what assurance does the government provide that, in the event of retaliation by the Nigerien army, no casualties will be recorded on Beninese soil?
8. Can the government reassure us that, in the event of war with Niger, potential jihadists will not exploit the situation to infiltrate our country, as was the case in Libya?
9. Would it not be wiser to prioritize political and diplomatic dialogue, as was done in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea?
10. Is it not possible for Bénin to lead, as it has in the past within ECOWAS, in preventing coups by combating electoral exclusions, imprisonment, and the exile of political opponents?
11. Why is ECOWAS more prompt to react against military coups d’état, yet tolerates institutional coups observed in Côte d’Ivoire in 2020, Guinea in 2021, and Bénin in 2019, 2020, and 2021, as well as in other countries?
12. Is the restoration of President Mohamed Bazoum‘s power more valuable than the lives of thousands of Nigerien civilians and ECOWAS contingent soldiers who could perish?
13. What would become of Niger after such a conflict?
14. The populations within the ECOWAS region no longer trust our organization, which they describe as a syndicate of Heads of State. What does Bénin intend to do to restore the image of this sub-regional body?
15. Following the extraordinary ECOWAS summit, President Patrice Talon mentioned dialogue as an alternative to coups d’état. When will the inclusive dialogue so desired by the Beninese opposition take place?
16. What are the impacts of closing our borders with Niger on the Autonomous Port of Cotonou?
17. What are the effects of the sanctions already imposed by ECOWAS on the Beninese economy and its population?
18. What immediate measures has the government already implemented to counteract the rising prices of essential commodities?
19. What fate does the Beninese government envisage for economic actors already suffering the consequences of sanctions imposed by ECOWAS (port operators, transporters, economic operators, etc.)?