This is a clear indication that both nations aim to craft a document rooted in lasting strategic interests. There is a shared ambition to create, mutatis mutandis, an equivalent of the Franco-German Élysée Treaty signed in 1963 by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.
This commission is not tasked with negotiating the treaty itself—that responsibility falls to the two governments—but with formulating proposals. What kind of proposals? The guiding principles of the partnership, strategic priorities for the 2035–2040 horizon, political dialogue mechanisms, and areas of cooperation in economics, security, military affairs, education, and culture.
That said, a fundamental question arises: why a friendship treaty? It will replace the so-called La Celle-Saint-Cloud agreement, signed in France on 6 November 1955, which formed the basis for Morocco’s return to independence and the end of the protectorate, officially recognized on 2 March 1956. Under that accord, Paris authorized the return to the throne of Mohammed V, who had been deported on 20 August 1953.
Today, the goal is likely to consolidate the gains of a privileged—indeed exceptional—cooperation, while laying the strategic foundations for an equal-to-equal relationship, designed to last for decades to come.
Four main pillars deserve highlighting. The first concerns the economy: Paris commits to making major investments in Moroccan industrial sectors—automotive, rail, defense, and maritime transport—and to supporting their modernization through cutting-edge technologies.
As for Rabat, its commitments revolve around several axes: preferential access for French companies to major infrastructure projects, along with tax incentives.
“This friendship treaty would bind France to a non-EU state, while Algeria has failed to finalize a similar agreement for over two decades, despite several attempts under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and later Emmanuel Macron and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.”
— Mustapha Sehimi
The second pillar covers security and defense industry cooperation: transfers of military technology aimed at eventually turning Morocco into a regional production hub for light and heavy equipment (aviation, ammunition, military vehicles, armored systems, etc.), expansion of joint training and exercise programs, and enhanced coordination on security and intelligence to address regional security challenges, especially in the Sahel.
The cultural domain constitutes a third, and by no means minor, pillar: maintaining the privileged position of the French language in the education system, promoting Francophonie without blocking the kingdom’s openness to a global business language like English, facilitating access for Moroccan students to French universities—currently over 42,000—expanding the network of twelve French cultural institutes, and opening new schools, particularly in the southern provinces.
As for the final pillar, it deals with geopolitics and strategy. What is it about? Paris supporting Morocco’s vital interests: backing the autonomy plan for the Sahara, validated by the Security Council within the framework of a negotiated settlement process (Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025), support within European Union institutions, defending Moroccan interests in sectors such as agriculture and fishing, and in various bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks.
Furthermore, France hopes to rely on Morocco to participate, in various ways, in new strategic alliances in West Africa, where it has gradually lost influence over the past decade. The objective? To leverage the kingdom’s position as a regional hub.
Ultimately, this treaty carries major symbolic and diplomatic weight. It would bind France to a non-EU state, while Algeria has never managed to finalize a similar deal in over two decades, despite several attempts under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and later Emmanuel Macron and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.
Morocco now asserts itself as a regional power, an economic hub, and a key player on energy, logistics, and security issues. This treaty could therefore take on a demonstrative and exemplary dimension: that of a model capable of rearticulating new forms of cooperation between Europe and Africa.
