A troubling paradox defines Morocco’s HIV response. Public clinics experience stockouts of rapid HIV tests lasting over a year, forcing patients to leave unscreened. Meanwhile, local manufacturers have approved kits ready for immediate delivery. This disconnect reveals a systemic failure: the public procurement system routinely ignores legal provisions that favour national production.
The legal framework is clear. Decree 2.22.431 governing public contracts includes a national preference mechanism. Technical specifications must be based on performance and function, not on brand, origin, or specific patent. Abdelhay Rhorba, professor of administrative law at Hassan II University in Casablanca, explains that ignoring this rule constitutes a breach of equal opportunity principles and can be considered an abuse of power.
“Inserting overly precise technical conditions or requiring certifications held only by a specific competitor violates the principle of equal opportunity and may amount to misuse of authority,” he says. Moroccan administrative courts assess such situations using a simple criterion: unjustified exclusion. If a tender document, even if formally correct, effectively shuts out local producers, it can be challenged.
Legal recourse exists: a preliminary complaint to the National Commission for Public Procurement before the contract is awarded, followed by an appeal to administrative courts within 60 days. If corruption is suspected, Moroccan criminal laws on influence peddling may also apply. But mounting a case against the administration requires resources many small producers lack.
On the ground, the reality is stark. The special prescriptions documents that define tender requirements are often drafted based on foreign products already in use, perpetuating old contracts without considering new domestic manufacturing capabilities.
A Moroccan medical device manufacturer, speaking on condition of anonymity, describes a Kafkaesque situation. His company sells its products in several African countries but holds less than 2% of Morocco’s public procurement market in its segment. “The technical specifications should be based on Moroccan products, but that is not done today,” he says.
When an industry player requests clarification from the contracting authority about a tender being skewed toward foreign products, the response is often silence. The tender remains unchanged.
The contradiction extends into the government itself. While the finance ministry recently raised customs duties on certain imported medical devices to encourage local production, the health ministry continues buying more expensive imported products, ignoring competitive local alternatives, according to sector sources.
The health ministry’s procurement directorate provided a written response, stating it acts “in strict compliance with the current regulatory framework” and that tenders are “open to all operators meeting the required conditions, with particular attention to operators established in Morocco.” However, it clarified that this requirement concerns the company’s place of registration, not the origin of manufacturing. A locally domiciled importer is treated equally to a Moroccan manufacturer.
The HIV test case is especially telling. Stockouts reportedly lasted over a year in some facilities. The ministry acknowledged “occasional tensions in some health structures,” attributing them to “delays related to public procurement procedures and disruptions in international supply chains.” New tenders are underway and “complementary alternatives” are being studied.
Many observers remain skeptical. If local producers have certified products in stock, why did shortages persist for months without emergency orders? On the issue of direct contracting, the ministry is emphatic: “No recourse to negotiated procedures was made in this context.” All 2025 acquisitions were conducted through open tenders. This directly contradicts information from multiple sources close to the matter. Without official documents made public, it is impossible to definitively settle the dispute.
Direct contracting is legal only under limited conditions: unforeseeable extreme urgency, justified technical exclusivity, or failed tenders. Decree 2.22.431 requires written justification and proof that no alternative exists. “Otherwise, the use of this procedure is considered illegal,” Rhorba notes.
Health sovereignty: a distant ideal
Behind the procurement issue lies Morocco’s health sovereignty. Professor Jaafar Heikel, a prominent infectious disease specialist, offers an important nuance: the absence of rapid tests does not mean a complete inability to diagnose. Public and private laboratories can usually perform standard biological analyses. But rapid tests have unique value in accessibility, speed, and reaching populations that do not use conventional facilities.
“NGOs like OPALS and ALCS play an extremely important role in HIV screening in Morocco,” he says. “They need these tests to reach people who might not go to a laboratory.” Interruptions in supply therefore have real consequences for grassroots response.
On local production, Heikel is clear: “When these locally made tests are validated by state bodies, it is very beneficial for the country, first for financial reasons and because it moves toward health sovereignty.”
2030 in jeopardy?
Morocco has committed to the UNAIDS 95-95-95 targets: 95% of people living with HIV know their status, 95% of diagnosed individuals are on treatment, and 95% of those treated have undetectable viral loads. These targets aim to end AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. They depend on widespread, rapid, accessible testing.
“When there are no tests, fewer people are screened and the disease has more chance to spread,” sums up a manufacturer. Heikel agrees: “We will reach the 95-95-95 goals faster if we have rapid tests and validated local production.”
The health ministry says it remains “fully mobilised to ensure continuity of screening services.” Sector players are waiting to see this commitment reflected in actual tender documents.
Today, questions are being asked openly: do some members of the compliance and validation commissions for tenders act to protect their own interests, or those of established foreign suppliers, in disregard of ministerial directives?
An investor who develops a validated product, responds to a tender, and is systematically excluded will not keep trying indefinitely. The risk is clear: discourage investment in domestic production at the very moment Morocco needs it most, and continue buying abroad what the country can make itself.
