Morocco’s 2024 census exposes gap between population growth and electoral representation

The rapid urban expansion revealed by Morocco’s 2024 census is reshaping the country’s demographic landscape. As sprawling suburbs swell and historic city centers shrink, the ratio of eligible voters per parliamentary seat has reached unprecedented disparities. Here’s how these shifts are straining the foundation of the 2026 legislative elections.

The 2024 General Population and Housing Census (RGPH 2024) has uncovered dramatic demographic shifts across Morocco. Over the past decade, Morocco’s urban periphery has expanded at an unprecedented pace, while historic city centers have seen population declines and rural areas have remained relatively stagnant. This transformation is now raising critical questions about the fairness of the current electoral map ahead of the 2026 legislative elections.

When we examine the voter-to-seat ratios across Morocco’s provinces, the disparities become glaringly apparent. The electoral system operates under two key principles:

• Demographic proportionality: allocating parliamentary seats based on population size
• Territorial equity: ensuring a minimum of two seats per province to prevent marginalization of less densely populated or remote regions

Extreme voter-to-seat ratios: a vote’s weight varies from 1 to over 70

The voter-to-seat ratio—calculated as the number of eligible voters per parliamentary seat—reveals stark contrasts. In sparsely populated southern provinces, this ratio is remarkably low:

• Aousserd: 2,992 eligible voters per seat
• Tarfaya: 5,368 eligible voters per seat
• Assa-Zag: 10,178 eligible voters per seat
• Es-Semara: 19,712 eligible voters per seat
• Boujdour: 20,185 eligible voters per seat

In contrast, Morocco’s major urban centers and their surrounding suburbs face extremely high ratios:

• Tanger-Assilah: 213,980 eligible voters per seat
• Ménara (Marrakech): 176,256 eligible voters per seat
• Sidi Bernoussi (Casablanca): 174,501 eligible voters per seat
• Nouaceur (Casablanca periphery): 155,172 eligible voters per seat
• Inezgane-Aït Melloul: 151,978 eligible voters per seat

This means a vote cast in a province like Aousserd carries significantly more weight in electing a representative than one cast in a major urban center like Tanger or Marrakech.

Urban-rural asymmetry: the rise of peripheral growth

The RGPH 2024 data confirms Morocco’s accelerating urbanization trend. Out of a total population of 36,828,330, urban residents now number 23,110,108—a jump of nearly 2.68 million over the past decade. Meanwhile, the rural population stands at 13,718,222, having grown by only 302,419 people in the same period. Notably, 71.2% of Morocco’s population is concentrated in just five regions: Grand Casablanca-Settat, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra, Marrakech-Safi, Fès-Meknès, and Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma.

One of the most striking patterns is the migration from historic city centers to peripheral municipalities. Casablanca-Anfa, for example, lost nearly a quarter of its population over the past decade, dropping from 453,000 to 332,000 residents. Yet it still retains four parliamentary seats, resulting in a ratio of 68,707 eligible voters per seat.

In stark contrast, the peripheral province of Nouaceur saw its population double in the same period, reaching 665,000 residents. With only three seats allocated, its voter-to-seat ratio stands at 155,172 eligible voters per seat.

This imbalance is mirrored in other metropolitan areas. In Rabat, the urban districts of Rabat-Océan and Rabat-Chellah maintain low ratios of 55,856 and 59,598 eligible voters per seat respectively, while the rapidly growing periphery of Skhirat-Témara faces a ratio of 141,832 eligible voters per seat.

Political implications of potential redistricting

Adjusting the electoral map to align with the 2024 census data involves complex political decisions for the 2026 elections. If the Interior Ministry opts to rebalance seats without increasing the total number of representatives in the Chamber of Representatives, it would need to reallocate seats from declining urban centers like Anfa or Rabat to expanding peripheries such as Nouaceur or Skhirat-Témara.

However, reducing the number of seats in a constituency intensifies electoral competition. Fewer seats naturally favor large parties with robust financial resources and established mobilization structures—particularly those in the current ruling coalition, including RNI, PAM, and Istiqlal.

Conversely, a higher number of seats per constituency lowers the threshold for parliamentary access through the “largest remainder” system, potentially benefiting smaller parties.

Rural anchoring and participation distortions

Despite urban growth, many city dwellers remain registered and vote in their rural hometowns to maintain local influence networks. This explains the consistently high turnout rates in rural areas—sometimes exceeding 90% of registered voters—contrasting sharply with the high abstention rates in urban centers, where turnout in middle-class districts can plummet to 70-80%.

The ongoing voter registration and list revision campaigns aim not only to enroll new voters but also to update records for citizens who have relocated from urban centers to fast-growing peripheries, correct registration errors, and enhance the overall reliability of the electoral roll ahead of the September 23, 2026 legislative elections.

Legislative elections 2026: the middle class and urban abstention challenge

The demographic realities exposed by the 2024 census present strategic challenges for the upcoming elections. Two key dynamics stand out:

• Mobilizing the urban middle class: squeezed by inflation and feeling disconnected from recent social assistance reforms targeting only the poorest households, middle-class urban voters largely abstained in 2021. Their potential return to the polls in 2026—whether through protest voting or support for alternative platforms—could reshape political balances.
• Political positioning: major ruling parties will need to defend their economic and social performance in a post-inflation context, while opposition groups like the PJD seek to capitalize on urban discontent and mobilize their traditional base, disappointed by past local governance.

Ultimately, reconciling the demographic realities revealed by the 2024 census with the preservation of territorial balances will require precise policymaking. While no official announcement on electoral redistricting has been made, the new population figures have set the stage for an unavoidable technical and political debate ahead of the 2026 legislative elections.