While Niamey continues to keep its frontier with Bénin closed, citing demands for security guarantees, the renewed collaboration between Chad and France presents a delicate question for Niger: if a French military presence in a neighboring state constitutes a threat justifying a border closure, should this same logic not extend to Chad?
The border between Niger and Bénin remains shut. Nearly three years following the July 2023 coup, the anticipated normalization between Niamey and Cotonou has not yet resulted in the actual reopening of this crucial communication route.
Despite numerous signs of easing tensions in recent months—including renewed dialogue and the establishment of a technical framework to assess reopening conditions—Niamey maintains its stringent demands. Discussions have also progressed on security, economic, and legal aspects.
In a recent public address, General Abdourahamane Tiani articulated that the border’s reopening must be contingent upon guarantees, particularly concerning security and the absence of forces deemed hostile near the frontier. This position reflects a stance upheld by Nigerien authorities for several years: Niamey insists that Béninese territory must not serve as a staging ground for operations that could jeopardize Niger.
However, Cotonou unequivocally contests this accusation.
Cotonou denies, Paris confirms no base
Since the onset of the crisis, Béninese authorities have rejected allegations that France maintains military bases within Bénin, especially in the country’s northern regions.
The Béninese government asserts it has never hosted any foreign military base on its soil. Olushegun Adjadi Bakari, Bénin’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterated this point in January 2025.
Paris has similarly denied the existence of a French military base in northern Bénin. In March 2026, General Fabien Mandon, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, dismissed these accusations, affirming no French base operates in that part of the country.
Nevertheless, a crucial distinction is warranted.
France does provide a form of security assistance to Bénin. French military personnel have been involved in training and supporting Béninese forces engaged with armed groups in the north. French authorities officially characterize these as trainers. Therefore, it is essential to differentiate between Franco-Béninese military cooperation, which is acknowledged, and the existence of a permanent French military base or deployment at the Nigerien border, which both Cotonou and Paris deny. This distinction lies at the heart of the current debate.
Niamey’s demands pose a new equation
Indeed, while Niger imposes conditions on Bénin, another of its neighbors is rekindling ties with Paris.
In November 2024, Chad had initially terminated its military cooperation with France, expressing its resolve to fully exercise sovereignty and diversify its security partnerships. The French withdrawal was then portrayed as a pivotal shift in relations between N’Djamena and Paris.
Yet, for several months, the two capitals have been drawing closer again. French military personnel are gradually returning to Chad, operating under a far more discreet and scaled-back arrangement than before.
This development addresses pressing security realities: Chad grapples with the repercussions of the conflict in Soudan, the persistent threat of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin, and significant requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and logistical capabilities. N’Djamena may thus interpret France’s return as a sovereign and pragmatic choice.
However, for Niamey, this decision raises a pertinent question.
Chad, too, shares a border with Niger.
Consequently, if Niamey deems a French military presence near its territory a sufficiently grave threat to prevent the reopening of its border with Bénin, how does Niger intend to react to the Franco-Chadian rapprochement?
Why would Chad be different from Bénin?
Here lies the fundamental paradox.
Niamey could legitimately assert that every state is free to choose its military partners. Under this reasoning, Bénin would possess the right to cooperate with France, and Chad would similarly be entitled to renew its partnership with Paris.
However, if this logic holds, it should then lead Niger not to make Franco-Béninese cooperation a decisive condition for the reopening of its border.
Conversely, if Niamey genuinely believes that French military cooperation with a neighbor constitutes a threat to its national security, then the same reasoning should, logically, apply to Chad.
The core issue is not whether Niger should close its border with Chad.
Rather, it tests the consistency of Niamey’s security rationale. Why would military cooperation with France be deemed unacceptable for Niger’s western neighbor, but acceptable for its eastern neighbor? Geography makes this question particularly sensitive. Niger shares extensive borders with both Bénin and Chad. Therefore, a foreign military presence in Chad could, theoretically, be considered part of Niamey’s immediate strategic environment.
France’s return to Chad: a test for sovereign doctrine
The Chadian situation unfolds within a dramatically transformed regional landscape in West Africa. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have elevated sovereignty and the severance of ties with former partner powers as foundational pillars of their new foreign policy. These three nations have withdrawn from ECOWAS and intensified their cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States.
Chad, conversely, has charted a distinct course. After severing ties with Paris in 2024, N’Djamena now appears keen to resume military cooperation with France, while simultaneously preserving its other partnerships.
This decision is sovereign.
However, it might prove difficult to reconcile with a conception of sovereignty that denies neighboring states the right to select their own partners. Thus, the debate today centers less on the French presence in Chad and more on the principle of coherence in African politics.
Towards a resolution between Niamey and Cotonou?
The situation could, however, evolve. The ongoing discussions between Niger and Bénin indicate that both nations recognize the significant economic and security costs associated with their closed border. In the border zone, populations, traders, and transporters have endured nearly three years of a political crisis that far transcends their local interests. Furthermore, violence in the border area between Bénin, Niger, and Nigeria has substantially increased, underscoring the vital importance of bilateral security cooperation between the two countries. Reopening the border could therefore emerge as a shared interest.
Yet, to achieve this, Niamey and Cotonou will likely need to move beyond the issue of France. The debate cannot sustainably remain confined to an opposition between ‘French presence’ and ‘African sovereignty.’
If Niger seeks security guarantees from Bénin, it is legitimate to request them. However, these guarantees must be grounded in verifiable facts, transparent mechanisms, and reciprocal commitments. Crucially, they must be applied according to the same principles to all neighbors.
The gradual resumption of French military cooperation in Chad thus imparts a new dimension to this crisis. Niamey now faces a choice: either acknowledge that each sovereign state is free to choose its partners, or uphold a doctrine where French military cooperation with a neighbor constitutes a threat justifying retaliatory measures.
In the former scenario, the reopening of the border with Bénin could be facilitated. In the latter, the rapprochement between N’Djamena and Paris risks posing a question to Niger that will be difficult to evade: if France is a threat in Bénin, why would it not be in Chad? It is perhaps within this apparent contradiction that one of the primary challenges of Sahelian diplomacy currently resides: ensuring sovereignty is a universally applicable principle, rather than an instrument selectively deployed according to power dynamics between neighboring states.
