Despite sweeping regime changes and radical geopolitical shifts, Niamey finds itself trapped in a grinding war of attrition. From Mahamadou Issoufou’s Western alliance strategy to Abdourahamane Tiani’s sovereignty-driven break, the grim reality remains unchanged: on the ground, the terrorist threat shows no sign of retreat.
Three presidents, two democratic transitions, one coup d’état, and a single constant: the bloodshed continues across the “three borders” zone and the Lake Chad basin. In Niger, governments come and go, but the jihadist hydra—embodied by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM)—endures.
When the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) seized power in July 2023, it vowed to restore security by expelling Western partners. Now, the country faces a harsh reality check. It is time to take stock of a war that, for now, seems unwinnable.
The Issoufou-Bazoum era: the illusion of a Western shield
Under President Mahamadou Issoufou (2011-2021), Niger positioned itself as the cornerstone of Western strategy in the Sahel. As neighbouring Mali’s state institutions crumbled, Niamey became the military hub for France (Operation Barkhane) and the United States (Agadez drone base).
His successor, Mohamed Bazoum, sought to add a layer of political flexibility:
- A “hand extended” approach by initiating dialogues with some repentant fighters.
- Heavy investment in training elite Nigerien special forces.
The flip side: while this strategy prevented the country’s collapse, it never managed to eliminate the threat. Worse, the presence of foreign troops fuelled deep frustration within parts of the army and the population, who saw it as a loss of sovereignty for what they considered insufficient results.
Tiani’s gamble: sovereignty put to the test by bullets
By overthrowing Mohamed Bazoum on 26 July 2023, General Abdourahamane Tiani and the CNSP justified their power grab by citing “the ongoing deterioration of the security situation.” What followed is well known: a dramatic break with Paris and Washington, the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali and Burkina Faso, and a strategic rapprochement with Russia (via the Africa Corps) and Turkey.
On the communications front, the shift is radical. The military leadership exalts national pride and promises a purely military response, free from Western “hidden agendas.”
The harsh reality on the ground
Yet reports from UN observers and strategic research centres agree: the departure of Western forces left an immediate capability gap, especially in aerial intelligence and technological surveillance.
Complex attacks are multiplying, sometimes targeting entire Nigerien defence and security forces (FDS) garrisons and causing heavy losses. The subsequent economic blockade imposed in certain regions, combined with diplomatic isolation, makes it harder to finance a war that costs millions of dollars daily.
Why is Niger stuck in this deadlock?
The common mistake of successive regimes—whether civilian or military—lies in treating a crisis that is primarily political and social as purely military. Two major approaches have failed:
On one hand, the Issoufou-Bazoum doctrine bet everything on integration into the international security architecture. Its main weakness was excessive external dependence, disconnected from popular aspirations, making the French narrative inaudible to much of Nigerien public opinion.
On the other hand, the Tiani doctrine favours a total geopolitical break and a martial sovereignty embodied by the AES. The limits of this formula are already visible on the ground: an immediate loss of advanced technological intelligence, suffocating financial isolation, and, paradoxically, an escalation of violence by armed groups who exploit regional disorganisation.
In both cases, the root causes remain unchanged: the absence of the state in peripheral areas, the lack of economic opportunities for rural youth, and intercommunal conflicts (particularly between herders and farmers) that jihadist groups skilfully exploit for recruitment.
Whether conducted to the tune of international cooperation or under the banners of AES sovereignty, the war in Niger cannot be won by arms alone. For General Tiani, the challenge is no longer just to criticise his predecessors’ record, but to prove that the current military formula can protect Nigeriens. Without a massive reintroduction of public services (schools, justice, health centres) into insecure zones, Niger risks seeing this war, effectively, lost in the long run.
