Sahel crisis deepens as jihadist violence and military rule escalate

The Sahel has faded from global headlines, yet its crises persist unabated. While international attention shifted to conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Congo, the Sahel’s decade-long struggles have only worsened. From Mali to Niger and Burkina Faso—the three nations forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—violence and instability continue to escalate, defying promises of security by military regimes that seized power in recent years.

Once touted as saviors, these juntas have failed to curb jihadist groups. Instead, extremist violence has surged, making the Sahel the world’s deadliest hotspot for jihadist attacks. Civilian casualties have tripled since 2021, with state forces—including Russian-backed Wagner mercenaries—contributing significantly to the death toll. Meanwhile, authoritarian crackdowns silence dissent, erode press freedom, and suppress civil society, further destabilizing the region.

Jihadist expansion and state failures in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger

The Malian dilemma: losing control to extremists and separatists

Since expelling the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) in 2023, Mali has seen a resurgence of armed conflict. The junta, backed by Russian forces, now battles both separatist Tuareg groups and jihadist factions—all labeled as “terrorists” by the transitional government. Despite regaining control of Kidal in 2023, the military’s position remains precarious. A July 2024 ambush by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM)—affiliated with Al-Qaeda—resulted in heavy losses for Malian troops and Wagner mercenaries, highlighting the regime’s vulnerability.

In September 2024, JNIM launched coordinated attacks on Bamako’s gendarmerie school and military airport, killing over 70 security forces and destroying the presidential aircraft. These high-profile strikes underscored the military’s inability to secure the capital while exposing the regime’s fragility. Unlike the Islamic State’s Sahel Province, which rules through fear, JNIM appears to cultivate local support—a strategy evident in its targeted messaging. Yet civilians pay the price: a July 2024 wedding massacre killed 40, followed by retaliatory drone strikes that claimed 20 more lives. Despite these setbacks, Malian public opinion still trusts the army’s supposed “strengthening,” according to 2024 surveys.

Burkina Faso: when the state surrenders to armed groups and militias

Since the 2022 coup, Burkina Faso’s security situation has deteriorated rapidly. By 2024, the army controlled just 40% of the territory, with JNIM active in 11 of 13 regions. The country recorded its deadliest attack in August 2024, when jihadists slaughtered between 130 and 600 civilians—many forced to dig trenches for the military in Barsalogho. State forces, too, have committed atrocities: in February 2024, soldiers executed 223 villagers in a single day, while militias like the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) massacred Peul civilians, sparking further reprisals.

The junta’s controversial decision to arm civilians—50,000 VDP recruits by 2022—has deepened ethnic tensions and civilian targeting. With blurred lines between soldiers, militias, and jihadists, Burkina Faso now has over 2 million internally displaced persons, the highest in the region. Forced recruitment of political opponents and VDP’s use as cannon fodder have turned society into a militarized battleground.

Niger’s fragile stability amid rising extremist lethality

Though Niger initially fared better than its AES neighbors, its security crisis has intensified since the 2023 coup. State forces killed three times more civilians in 2024 than the previous year, while jihadist attacks surged. In March and December 2024, coordinated strikes killed 23 soldiers and 39 civilians, respectively, with Islamic State affiliates targeting a mosque in March 2025, leaving 44 dead. Despite these challenges, Niger remains slightly more stable—though the trajectory remains alarming.

Eternal transitions: how juntas cling to power

The AES regimes—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—have systematically extended their transitions, rewriting constitutions to delay elections and consolidate authority. Mali’s junta, which seized power in 2020, initially promised 18-month elections but now seeks a five-year extension, allowing its leader to remain in power until 2029. Burkina Faso’s Captain Traoré and Niger’s General Tchiani followed suit, promoting themselves to army generals while pushing for multi-year transitions. These maneuvers not only entrench military rule but also pave the way for deeper regional integration under the AES framework.

By delaying democracy, these regimes prioritize geopolitical realignment—such as the AES’s new joint force and Russian support—over domestic stability. The EU must recognize this shift in its engagement strategies, balancing pragmatic diplomacy with principled pressure.

Information control: the junta’s weapon against dissent

Unable to assert territorial control, the AES regimes have weaponized information. Independent and foreign media—including RFI, France 24, and Jeune Afrique—face suspensions, expulsions, or shutdowns. Journalists critical of the juntas risk arbitrary arrests, forced conscription, or exile, while civil society organizations are dismantled. In Niger, even NGOs and opposition figures face detention, with former President Bazoum held incommunicado since 2023.

The junta’s narrative often contradicts ground realities. In October 2024, Burkina Faso’s government claimed to control 70% of its territory—exactly the percentage attributed to jihadist groups by independent observers. By stifling truth, these regimes manipulate public perception, obscuring the true scale of their failures.

Why the Sahel’s silence is not stability

The Sahel’s absence from global headlines stems from Western fatigue, media repression, and shifting geopolitical priorities. Yet the crises raging there—jihadist expansion, food insecurity, and mass displacement—pose long-term risks for Europe and beyond. With 3.1 million internally displaced persons in the Sahel by early 2025 and 52.7 million West Africans facing acute hunger between June and August 2025, the stakes could not be higher.

While the EU reassesses its role, it must avoid a complete withdrawal. Instead, Brussels should pursue targeted engagement—collaborating with local actors, supporting humanitarian efforts, and pressuring juntas to restore civilian rule. The alternative is a Sahel where instability metastasizes, with consequences reverberating across Africa and into Europe.

One truth remains clear: silence in the Sahel does not equal safety. Ignoring the crisis ensures it will not disappear.