The Senegalese political landscape frequently witnesses intense power struggles, whether they unfold between figures within the same party or across different political factions. As the British diplomat Lord Palmerston famously asserted in 1848, the political realm is devoid of permanent adversaries or allies, recognizing only enduring interests.
In politics, there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent interests.
This timeless adage perfectly encapsulates the current situation at the pinnacle of Senegal’s executive branch. The once seemingly unified Sonko-Diomaye alliance, featuring President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko, now faces significant internal discord. These profound disagreements culminated on May 22 with President Faye announcing the dismissal of his Prime Minister and the dissolution of the entire government.
While a major rally on November 8, 2025, offered early indications of these fratricidal divisions, a subsequent interview on May 2, 2026, unequivocally confirmed them. President Faye himself openly acknowledged disagreements with his Prime Minister, specifically criticizing the “excessive personalization” of power that had begun to center around Sonko.
My ongoing analysis of recent transformations within the Senegalese political system, particularly through the rise of Les Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité (PASTEF), the ruling party, and the sociopolitical realignments observed between 2021 and 2024 amidst considerable political instability, reveals how this anti-establishment party successfully disrupted Senegal’s traditional sociopolitical order.
The illusion of shared symbolic capital: a two-headed challenge
The extraordinary tandem initially formed when Sonko, after his own candidacy was invalidated, chose Diomaye to run. Their partnership was forged on a dynamic of political complementarity, with one managing state affairs and the other providing strong political legitimacy during the initial months of their administration.
However, the large PASTEF political gathering on November 8, 2025, exposed the inherent limitations of this two-headed illusion, which had been largely sustained by Sonko. “The period after November 8,” as Sonko himself declared, marked a critical juncture for the future institutional partnership between the President and himself. The relationship between the two leaders has since reached an impasse. Initial disagreements surfaced regarding the choice of coordinator for the ruling coalition, followed by conflicting visions of power, and ultimately, disputes over preferred allies.
Consequently, the once unifying slogan “Sonko mooy Diomaye” (Sonko is Diomaye, in Wolof), which served as PASTEF’s survival strategy against the regime of former President Macky Sall, has begun to wane. It is now being supplanted by slogans such as “Sonko est Sonko” or “Ousmane est Sonko.” This shift aligns with observations from journalists like Sidy Diop, who argue that “the proclaimed unity has faded. It gives way to a now visible, almost overt duality, where roles are being redefined and ambitions are asserting themselves.”
“Diomaye is no longer Sonko. Sonko is no longer Diomaye.” Yet, from the perspective of symbolic domination and reproduction theory, which allowed Sonko to generate a “capital by proxy,” their symbolic merger had created a unique “partisan habitus.” Within this framework, the homopastefien and supporters of “the Project” no longer perceived two distinct representatives but rather a single, indivisible political force.
This duality at the top represents the natural evolution of their initial “complementarity” upon entering the executive political arena. The inherently presidential nature of Senegal’s political system mandates a clear distinction, where the President’s authority is not shared. The prerogatives of the President and the Prime Minister are constitutionally defined in articles 42 to 52, effectively transforming their initial fusion into a “gentle rivalry.”
President Faye often adopts a reserved posture, positioning himself as the guarantor of institutions, while Sonko maintains his characteristic style of mobilization and disruption. This phenomenon aligns with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu described as the “position occupying the man,” where institutional roles dictate an individual’s actions, language, and demeanor, rather than the inverse. The presidential function imposes a “sovereign” habitus that inherently distinguishes itself from the “party leader” habitus of the Prime Minister. This ethical separation between the roles of head of state and party leader prompted President Faye to resign from his position as Secretary General and all other leadership bodies within the PASTEF party.
Furthermore, an unspoken yet significant boundary exists between the President and his Prime Minister: the transition from informal “street communication” like “Diomaye is Sonko” to formal institutional communication, where the President’s image takes precedence according to protocol. While Sonko was instrumental in bringing Diomaye to power, the latter now wields discretionary authority, including the power of appointment, thereby creating a political bipolarization between pro-Diomaye and pro-Sonko factions.
The inherent limitations of a dual leadership
In physics, the mechanics of fluids dictate that when two bodies of differing masses share a common enclosure, the one with superior mass will inevitably compress the other. Applying this to President Faye and Sonko, it underscores that power, unlike human nature, is not static.
Through an upward flow of influence, his charisma, and control over the party, Ousmane Sonko infused Bassirou Diomaye Faye with popular legitimacy. Conversely, through a downward flow of influence, Bassirou Diomaye, via his decrees and state decisions, materializes the aspirations of “the Project” by embedding them within Senegalese positive law. Thus, if Sonko’s influence becomes too expansive, it overflows into Diomaye’s institutional territory.
In such a scenario, the President risks appearing to be under tutelage. Conversely, if Diomaye becomes too isolated, he risks losing the crucial vein of legitimacy that Sonko provides. They exist within a system of mutual dependence, yet also one with potential for self-destruction. Power continuously oscillates between the presidential office and the Prime Minister’s residence, which is precisely what sustains this delicate “gentle rivalry.”
By mimicking each other’s desires, they risk becoming antagonistic doubles. The more they resemble one another, the deeper their divergence becomes, as each sees the mirror of their own ambition in the other. Both leaders covet the same objectives: power, the presidency, and ultimate leadership. Sonko aspires to hold executive power, while Diomaye seeks to consolidate his position.
The current power struggle at the highest levels reminds us that in African politics, the “gentlemen’s agreement” remains merely a myth for idealists. It is the perennial re-emergence of the “number two syndrome.” The presumptive successor, initially loyal and competent, ascends through the ranks only to turn against his leader once that leader commands all the spotlight.
Meanwhile, the hegemonic figure, driven by the logic of securing future electoral victories, transforms a loyal ally into an adversary out of mistrust. This dynamic fosters a reciprocal paranoia that portends a period of significant social and political turbulence across this key West Africa nation.
