A year has passed since the officialization of its charter and the establishment of its confederation, yet the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, frequently faces scrutiny regarding its ability to fulfill its core pledge: mutual defense. Amidst recent security escalations and significant jihadist attacks impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a joint armed intervention raises questions among local populations and regional observers across West Africa. Several structural and strategic elements account for this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.
National armies already stretched thin
The primary constraint remains the overextension of national armed forces. Each member state within the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:
- In Mali: The national army and its allies continue to concentrate efforts on maintaining control over the North and Center, battling the Permanent Strategic Framework (JIM) and groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
- In Burkina Faso: Over half of the national territory endures persistent pressure from recurring terrorist assaults.
- In Niger: Security forces must simultaneously secure the critical tri-border region (Liptako-Gourma) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the volatile Lake Chad basin.
Given these pervasive internal demands, none of the three Sahelian nations possesses sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a significant contingent to a neighboring country without compromising its own national security apparatus.
Logistical hurdles for the joint force
While the political decision to unify forces was affirmed during AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters substantial material realities:
- Interoperability and command: Harmonizing disparate military doctrines and establishing an integrated chain of command requires considerable time and secure communication networks.
- Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops over vast distances within the Sahel necessitates extensive resources for armored transport, resupply, and aerial intelligence (including drones and combat aviation)—capabilities that are currently limited and heavily utilized within each nation’s own operational zones.
The role of external partners
The departure of traditional military forces, notably France and the UN mission MINUSMA, prompted the three military regimes to pivot their partnerships towards Russia, particularly through the deployment of the paramilitary Africa Corps. However, these support forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally mandated to conduct cross-border operations under the collective banner of the AES.
A strategic choice favoring intelligence
Beyond the projection of large-scale troop deployments, AES authorities emphasize an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted, localized operations along shared borders. For Sahelian military commands, intervention does not necessarily manifest as a visible, large-scale deployment, but rather as coordinated actions within the tri-border zone, where each national army prioritizes operations originating from its own territory to address pressing Sahel security challenges.
