The French stance on the critical situation unfolding in Mali is becoming increasingly clear. Bruno Fuchs, a centrist (Modem) and the President of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee, a figure frequently accompanying President Emmanuel Macron on his travels, articulated this position without reservation in a recent interview.

Beyond optimistic assertions about France’s future presence across the continent – suggesting that “eliminating all irritants, like the CFA franc and visa issues, would restore France as a desired power” – the most striking aspect of this discussion lies in an inherent contradiction. It juxtaposes promises to abandon the colonial-era Françafrique relationship with a persistent preoccupation with reclaiming influence lost to Russia.

The commentary concerning Mali proved particularly cynical and vexing. Bruno Fuchs, echoing what appears to be a sentiment among various French military and political strategists who reportedly welcomed the complex attack on April 25, presented a distinct narrative: “The Russians are currently negotiating their withdrawal from Mali, and the ruling junta in Bamako will fall within weeks or months.”

Recalling President Emmanuel Macron’s statement made in Nairobi just days prior – “the departure of French military personnel was undoubtedly not the best decision the putschists made for their country” – the interviewer inquired whether “France welcomed the military setbacks experienced by the Russians in northern Mali.”

“removing the french partner was counter-productive”

Bruno Fuchs sidestepped the direct question, instead paraphrasing the President: “Removing the French partner was counter-productive.” The implicit message was clear. The deputy then continued his scenario: “I believe the Malian junta has only days or weeks left. Today, it finds itself in a weak position relative to the FLA and the JNIM. Therefore, the regime in Mali is set to change within weeks or months; it is inevitable.”

The parliamentarian then ventured onto particularly sensitive ground. “Malians face a choice between integralist jihadists [a curious concept] – though not for all [even more fascinating] (…) and FLA rebels on one side, and democratic life, public liberties, and the former way of life in Mali on the other.” “Life in Mali is likely to change,” he reiterated, seemingly oblivious to the fourteen years of conflict already endured by the beleaguered population.

“how to integrate the jnim?“

With unwavering confidence, Bruno Fuchs proceeded to outline Mali’s political future. In his view, two scenarios are plausible. In the first, Bamako agrees to negotiate. “If the junta and President Assimi Goïta act reasonably, they will open negotiations. There would be a transition period of three to six months involving one of the Transition’s military figures – I won’t name names, but it wouldn’t be Assimi Goïta – leading to elections within three or six months.” Setting aside the unrealistic timeline, such a transition, initiated under pressure from the JNIM, would, he argued, raise a central question: “The question arises: within governance, within shared work, how do we integrate the JNIM?” This phrasing warrants scrutiny: the JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate, and its leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, was considered France’s public enemy number one, a conflict in which France lost 57 soldiers in the Sahel.

Regarding the JNIM, Bruno Fuchs appeared to possess firsthand information, arguably more than any Malian. A significant revelation indeed!

“I believe the JNIM is prepared to lay down its arms and cease armed struggle, provided it can participate in the country’s political life. Not to seize control of Mali, but to participate in political life.” The President of the Foreign Affairs Committee did not explain why the most powerful actor on the ground would content itself with mere participation without asserting dominance. Perhaps, as is commonly known, the important thing is not to win but to participate. This presents a cruel dilemma: “The question that will arise for us, Europeans or French, is what do we do? Do we support this transition in which the JNIM plays a political role, or do we not? I don’t have the answer, but it’s a real problem of conscience and a real political problem.” Indeed, it is a serious question, not only “for us, Europeans or French,” but primarily for the Malian people.

“the worst: afghanistan”

• Bruno Fuchs presented a second scenario. “The junta absolutely wants to resist, refuses to negotiate, and at some point, finds itself in a position of weakness. The Russians are negotiating their departure, contrary to what they claim (…). At that point, the junta will fall. If it’s not negotiated, it will certainly be worse than if there had been a negotiation.” Worse for whom? For Mali, for the region, for France? Fuchs did not specify. Reverting to his first scenario, the deputy elaborated on the potential outcomes of the hoped-for negotiations.

“We could see a Mauritanian-style model, meaning a religious regime; or a Nigerian-style model, a federal state in Mali where some states apply Sharia law (…) and others do not. So, ultimately, a federal state with different regimes, guaranteeing the representativeness and role of each community in the country’s political life, as in Nigeria, for example.” This scenario appears to be Bruno Fuchs’s preference: a not-too-extremist Islamic Republic where each community’s representation and role are guaranteed. How? He did not elaborate, which would have advanced the discussion. The challenge for Mali, in fact, is that communities share the same space; they do not yet live in separate enclaves. Thus, the entire concept remains vague, even nebulous.

The second scenario, described as the “ultimate outcome,” is Afghanistan. While Bruno Fuchs seemed comfortable with the first, he stated he did not “wish to see an Afghanistan in the heart of the Sahel, because that would have consequences for the entire zone,” referring not only to the Sahelian nations but also their “innocent” neighbors: Guinea, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Bénin, and Togo. “Complicated,” he concluded, an understatement indeed for the West Africa region.

“the russians are reportedly ready to withdraw”

Somewhat taken aback by these definitive pronouncements, the interviewer pressed further: “Do you have information indicating that the Russians are preparing to leave Bamako?”

Indeed, Bruno Fuchs replied without hesitation. “They are negotiating. They have repositioned their forces. Negotiations are currently underway.” Regarding the uncertain outcome of these discussions, “everything depends on the JNIM, everything depends on the junta.” However, he remained confident that the Russians “would be prepared to withdraw, provided certain guarantees are secured regarding the assets they currently exploit in Mali, such as the gold mines, which they are reluctant to see expropriated, even if their legitimacy to exploit them is, in my opinion, quite debatable.”

Bruno Fuchs, despite expressing a desire to close the unfortunate chapter of Françafrique with its “colonial-era behavior,” this history “unresolved with Francophone Africa,” and the practice of imposing “our truths and views” without tolerating “resistance,” nevertheless held strong opinions on who legitimately should or should not exploit Mali’s resources.

The underlying message was that France and, by extension, Europe – “to avoid being immodest” – possess greater legitimacy than Russia. And why? Because France “is reliable in its commitments,” unlike the Americans and Russians, “who are leaving Mali because things are not going well for them.” Without missing a beat in his contradictions, he then cited the example of the Central African Republic, with which “we have normalized our relations, re-established normal relations with President Faustin Archange Touadéra” even though “the Russians are still present there.” “We must learn to work with everyone,” he concluded.

With everyone, that is, except the disfavored leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States, a key topic in African politics and pan-African news.