September 7, 2026
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The quiet that has returned to Niamey’s streets should not deceive anyone.

The battle is over, but the political war has only just begun.

In the night of 28 to 29 August, Nigerian soldiers attempted to overthrow the regime of General Abdourahamane Tiani. The attack, launched notably by troops from units engaged on various fronts across the country, targeted strategic installations in the capital, including Air Base 101 and areas near the presidential palace.

For several hours, the government tottered.

To save it, Tiani had to call on his Russian allies.

Members of Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa, intervened alongside loyalist Nigerian forces. They took part in retaking the air base and neutralising the mutinous soldiers. It has been confirmed that the Nigerian army regained control of the base with the support of Russian paramilitary forces.

This is the major political fact of the crisis: Nigerian soldiers were fought on Nigerian soil with the direct support of Russian forces dispatched to protect the regime that came to power through the 2023 coup.

Yet the junta had made national sovereignty its principal argument for expelling French and American forces.

Sovereignty with a double standard

For years, Tiani and his supporters argued that the French military presence was a humiliation and an infringement on national sovereignty.

The French soldiers left.

The Americans were asked to depart.

Western military agreements were denounced.

The regime’s propaganda could then proclaim that Niger had finally regained its full independence.

But an embarrassing question now arises: what is the point of expelling the French military if, a few years later, the government must call on Russian troops to save its presidential seat?

The question is all the more explosive because the Russians did not intervene to defend Nigerian territory against jihadist groups. They intervened to help the government repel Nigerian soldiers who threatened the regime.

The symbolism is devastating.

Nigerien soldiers have been dying for years in the Sahel’s war zones. They fight the Islamic State and JNIM, suffer heavy losses, and regularly denounce their combat conditions. The Niamey mutiny appears to have been fuelled precisely by this accumulated frustration among units facing daily jihadist violence.

And when these same soldiers eventually turn against the government, it is the Russians who come to fight them.

What sovereignty remains when the national government can no longer ensure its own survival without foreign protection?

The growing rift between Tiani and his army

The 29 August mutiny is likely the most serious warning sign Tiani has received since coming to power.

The problem is not merely that soldiers attempted to overthrow him.

The problem is that they were able to do so even though Niger officially possesses a considerable security apparatus.

Above all, dissent appears to have found fertile ground within the ranks of the regular army itself.

Soldiers deployed on the front lines are the ones paying the highest price in this war. They see their comrades fall. They face material shortages. They witness jihadist attacks continuing despite the junta’s promises.

Since 2023, Tiani has promised to restore security and give Niger back its dignity.

Three years later, jihadist violence remains a major threat, and Nigerian forces continue to suffer significant losses.

In this context, part of the army now seems to be questioning whether the regime has drifted away from those who actually fight on the ground.

The Russian intervention may have turned that frustration into hatred.

A Nigerian soldier can accept dying to defend his country. He can accept hardship and sacrifice in the name of the nation.

But it will be much harder for him to accept foreigners firing at him to protect a political regime.

From Bazoum’s overthrower to Moscow’s protégé

The historical irony is dizzying.

In July 2023, Tiani seized power claiming he wanted to save Niger from a political system that had failed to guarantee the security of its citizens.

He overthrew democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum, pretending to end the failures of civilian rule.

Now, three years later, it is his own power that requires foreign fighters to withstand a military revolt.

This trajectory is hard to ignore.

Tiani came to power through a coup.

He now stays in power thanks to a security apparatus of which a key component is Russian.

In other words, the man who claimed to free Niger from foreign tutelage seems to have replaced a Western dependency with a Russian one.

It is precisely this contradiction that could become the regime’s Achilles’ heel.

What if Bazoum had accepted French help?

Let us also revisit July 2023.

When Tiani overthrew Mohamed Bazoum, France still had over a thousand soldiers in Niger. Paris supported the elected president and, under certain circumstances, considered an operation to help secure his release.

Bazoum’s associates had requested French intervention. According to information reported at the time, an operation was considered, but Bazoum ultimately preferred dialogue and refused direct French military action.

That decision now belongs to history.

But a question remains: if Bazoum had accepted French intervention, would Tiani have succeeded in his coup?

No one can rewrite history with certainty.

Yet it is entirely legitimate to note that Tiani benefited from that hesitation. The elected president remained imprisoned in the presidential palace while the junta gradually consolidated its control over the state apparatus.

The most ironic twist is that today, the man who denounced the French presence in Niger turns to a foreign power to save his own rule.

Algeria steps into the fray

As if the Russian presence were not enough, Algeria has just taken a significant step forward.

Following the attempted overthrow of Tiani, Algiers deployed military assets to Niamey, including combat and transport aircraft. This decision marks a major shift in Algerian doctrine, which has long been characterised by reluctance to commit forces beyond its borders.

Algeria ultimately did not have to do battle with the mutineers; they had already been repelled with Russian help.

But the message was clear.

Tiani would no longer stand alone.

Moscow provides military protection for the regime. Algiers now offers strategic support. The junta can present this show of support as proof that Niger has gained new allies.

Yet behind this display of force lies a troubling question: how many foreign powers will it take to protect a government that is progressively losing the support of its own army?

A volcano under the barracks

The 29 August mutiny may therefore not be an isolated incident.

It could be the first symptom of a much deeper rupture.

Russian weapons allowed Tiani to win one battle.

They have not resolved the frustrations of Nigerian soldiers.

They have not destroyed the jihadist groups.

They have not brought back the soldiers who died at the front.

They have not reconciled the troops with the government.

They merely allowed the regime to survive a first overthrow attempt.

And that is precisely where the danger lies for Tiani.

A regime can control a palace with the help of foreign forces. It can retake a military base. It can arrest mutineers.

But it cannot indefinitely rule against an army that has begun to view its own government as dependent on a foreign power.

General Tiani should therefore look beyond the walls of his palace.

The real threat to his regime may not come from Paris, Washington, or even the Western capitals he regularly accuses of plotting against him.

It could be lurking in Nigeria’s barracks.

And if the soldiers who watched their comrades fall under foreign bullets decide one day to settle scores with those they blame for handing their country to Moscow, the next mutiny could prove far harder to contain.

The Russians can protect Tiani.

Algeria can offer support.

But no foreign power can forever replace the loyalty of a national army.

Tiani’s regime may have won the battle of 29 August, but it may have lost something far more precious: the trust of those who wear the Nigerian uniform.