In Sénégal, religion extends beyond the private sphere, playing a vital role in fostering social cohesion, mediating conflicts, educating citizens, and occasionally influencing political regulation. Despite this significant involvement, the relationship between the State and religious communities largely operates through informal channels. This raises a crucial question: can the institutionalization of religious affairs help transcend clientelism without undermining the nation’s secular principles? The discussion may no longer be about *whether* to formalize State-religious interactions, but *how* to achieve this without actually institutionalizing religion itself.
First, it is essential to dispel a common misconception: formalizing the relationship between the State and religious communities does not automatically mean turning religion into a state matter. Several African nations have already opted to establish public bodies dedicated to religious affairs.
Mali, for instance, operates a Ministry of Religious Affairs, Worship, and Customs, while Guinea has a General Secretariat for Religious Affairs. Côte d’Ivoire maintains a specific administration overseeing religious worship. Morocco has taken this institutionalization much further, notably through the Superior Council of Ulemas and the role of Amir Al-Mouminine (Commander of the Faithful).
Even Sénégal has embarked on a preliminary phase of institutionalization. The establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Integration of Arabic Language Graduates in April 2024 marked a significant initial step. Djim Dramé, the director, openly states that the objective is precisely to “formalize relations between the State and religions” and to foster peace, harmony, and coexistence. Therefore, the current debate revolves less around the appropriateness of having an administration for religious matters and more about the extent of institutionalization Sénégal intends to implement.
Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé views the proposed transformation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs into a General Delegation as a “positive evolution” and an “institutional elevation.” His compelling argument highlights that “religion is a resource in our country,” particularly for social cohesion and the adoption of public policies.
If religion already serves as a crucial social, cultural, and even political resource for Sénégal, why persist in managing its interactions with the State primarily through personal relationships, courtesy visits, ad hoc delegations, and situational arrangements? It is within this framework that the proposal put forth by Ousmane Sonko gains relevance.
Sonko advocates for a robust institutionalization of State-religious community relations, structured around several key proposals: establishing a budget for religious worship, upgrading the Delegation for Religious Affairs to a Secretariat of State or a full-fledged ministry, officially recognizing certain privileges granted to religious leaders, and regulating special funds through a commission of sworn individuals.
A “collaboration-based secularism between politics and religion”
The underlying principle is clear: to move away from a system of discretionary favors towards pre-defined rights and regulations. When a religious leader obtains an administrative advantage due to proximity to the President, it is a favor. However, if the same advantage is governed by a formal text, with clearly defined conditions applicable to all leaders meeting the same criteria, it becomes an institutional process. Thus, the State’s role should not be to control religion, but to establish a framework for organizing its interactions with it.
Sénégal is a secular state. This constitutional reality cannot be circumvented or diluted. The Constitution affirms that the Republic is secular, democratic, and social, ensuring equality among citizens without religious distinction and respecting all beliefs. Therefore, the institutionalization of religious worship cannot lead to any form of state religion.
However, the question remains whether secularism prohibits the State from organizing its relations with religious bodies. Political science professor Maurice Soudieck Dione aptly demonstrates that Senegalese secularism possesses a unique history. It does not precisely mirror the French model of strict separation. He describes it as a “collaboration-based secularism between politics and religion.” This distinctiveness of the Senegalese model lies in its operation through a “pragmatic accommodation” with confraternities and the Church.
Nevertheless, the debate cannot be oversimplified to: “since religion holds a significant place in society, a Ministry of Worship must be created.” Seydou Ka, a journalist-columnist for Le Soleil, cautions against the risk of transforming secularism into a form of administrative control over religion. He articulates concerns about a “bureaucratization of the sacred” and a potential drift towards a “laicism” that could weaken the autonomy of religious leaders.
This observation is fundamental, as there is a clear distinction between institutionalizing relations *with* religions and institutionalizing religions *themselves*. In the former case, the State creates an administrative interlocutor. In the latter, it gradually begins to define who is legitimate, who can speak on behalf of a community, which activities should be authorized, how places of worship should operate, and which religious leaders can receive public recognition.
The fear of a “bureaucratization of the sacred”
The State’s ambition to organize religions themselves carries an evident risk and could fundamentally alter their nature. Researcher Bakary Sambe has succinctly summarized the danger inherent in the relationship between politics and religion in Sénégal. He observes that “our leaders seek in religion a legitimacy they lack in politics.” The peril of institutionalization would precisely be to transform an already clientelistic relationship into a bureaucratized form of clientelism. Instead of politicians sporadically seeking religious blessings, permanent mechanisms for distributing public resources could emerge.
It is precisely because these risks exist that institutionalization appears necessary. Currently, a significant portion of the interactions between the State and religious authorities remains personalized. A president cultivates a specific relationship with a particular khalife. A minister maintains close ties with a certain religious family. A community might more easily secure investments due to its religious influence.
An event receives special support because it is a major religious gathering. The question then arises: is it better to leave these practices informal or to subject them to public regulations? In my view, institutionalizing them is preferable. However, with an important clarification: we must not institutionalize faith itself; rather, we must institutionalize the State’s relationship with religious practices.
This perspective aligns with Djim Dramé’s assertion that the Directorate of Religious Affairs aims to listen to “all religious sensitivities” and formalize State-religion relations. The National Council of Laity has also expressed support for this approach, viewing the Directorate as a potentially effective interface between the Church and the State. Its president, Philippe Abraham Tine, however, emphasized the need to clearly explain the structure’s role to prevent misunderstandings. This interconfessional dimension is crucial.
Sénégal is a profoundly religious society. Muslims constitute a vast majority, while Christian communities have a considerable historical and social presence. This socio-historical reality warrants an institutional response. If the State supports citizens in education, health, culture, or sports, why should it consider religious matters as a reality it can never institutionally acknowledge?
A public policy for religious affairs
The State can support pilgrimages, contribute to securing major religious events, facilitate training, participate in the renovation of certain places of worship, or assist religious institutions, provided that the rules are transparent and the same principles of equity are applied. Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé specifically highlights the goal of supporting “Muslim, Christian, and traditional religious communities” in their worship and development. Fundamentally, Ousmane Sonko’s proposal initiates a debate far more significant than a mere administrative question.
It compels Sénégal to critically examine its unique model of secularism. Seydou Ka reminds us of the risk of bureaucratizing the sacred. Étienne Smith encourages us to consider “proportional equidistance.” Seydi Diamil Niane stresses the necessity of institutionalizing relations between public authorities and religious leaders. Maurice Soudieck Dione illustrates a distinctive collaboration between the political and religious spheres.
The experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea, Niger, and Burkina Faso each demonstrate various methods for organizing these interactions. Sonko, however, poses another question: why continue to manage through favors what could be organized by law? This is where the true value of his proposition lies. Provided, of course, that a fundamental error is avoided: institutionalizing worship must not mean nationalizing religion. The State must remain secular. Religions must retain their autonomy. And citizens must be free to practice their faith.
Therefore, I would not necessarily advocate for a “Ministry of Religion,” which might suggest the State is managing spiritual matters. Instead, I would champion a republican institution tasked with transparently and equitably organizing the relations between the State and religious denominations. For Sénégal cannot pretend that religion does not exist.
The question, then, is no longer whether to institutionalize religious affairs, but how to do so without losing the unique essence of Senegalese secularism. In my opinion, the correct answer lies in one principle: do not institutionalize faith. Institutionalize the relations *with* faith. This is the only path to reconcile republican secularism, religious freedom, confessional equity, and the autonomy of religious communities.
