On the evening of Friday, 25 September 2026, the JNIM announced it had seized full control of several militia positions at Silmossin, close to the town of Dédougou. The statement came on the same day the group said it had overrun two positions held by the Burkinabè army and the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) at Aoréma and Klio, in the north of the country. Beyond the accuracy of any single claim, the sheer repetition poses the question now hanging over Ouagadougou: how much real protection does the security doctrine built since Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power actually deliver, and how long can it hold?
A rhythm of announcements that outstrips any explanation
Each new claim is difficult to verify independently, and that uncertainty is precisely what makes it politically heavy. When armed groups repeatedly announce operations against national forces and VDP units, the burden shifts onto the state to show that its own account of the war matches what is happening on the ground.
The problem runs deeper than a single position lost or retaken. Recovering a village or an outpost is not the same as restoring the state’s authority there over time.
What the doctrine promises and what it must prove
For several years, the authorities have presented the reconquest of territory, the strengthening of national forces and the mobilisation of the VDP as the three pillars of a new security approach. But a military strategy cannot be judged solely by the number of troops deployed, operations announced or areas declared liberated. The decisive measure is whether the state can keep its positions, protect civilians, secure road corridors and stop armed groups from filtering back into zones it has cleared.
It is in that endurance that the difficulties persist.
Wider reach, thinner lines: the VDP gamble
Heavy reliance on the VDP has stretched the defence architecture across more territory, but it has also placed non-professional fighters in some of the most exposed positions. Assessments of JNIM operations consistently point to the factors that decide outcomes: intelligence, mobility, logistics, surveillance of roads, coordination between units and, above all, the capacity to hold forward positions over the long term.
A genuinely secure area is one where administration functions again, schools reopen, markets resume trading, farmers return to their fields and displaced families come home.
An admission from the government’s own ranks
Since taking power, Captain Traoré has made sovereignty, popular mobilisation and military reconquest central to his political message. Official communication regularly highlights the successes of national forces. Yet as long as armed groups keep announcing attacks on military or VDP positions, those statements have to be weighed against observable realities.
On 25 September, the country’s foreign minister himself acknowledged the need to draw lessons from what “has not worked so far”, stressing the importance of preventing young people from being recruited by terrorist groups. That remark matters: even within the official camp, the purely military answer is recognised as insufficient.
An insurgency that keeps rewriting the rules
Burkina Faso is confronting an unusually adaptable insurgency. The JNIM has built up capabilities in mobility, intelligence, financing and the use of new technologies, while its operations continue to squeeze security forces and civilian populations alike. Conflict analysts point to shifting jihadist tactics, the growing use of drones and the difficulty Sahelian states face in preventing armed groups from reoccupying spaces they have been pushed out of.
The challenge for Ibrahim Traoré is therefore no longer simply to project a narrative of victory. It is to demonstrate, with figures and verifiable results, that the strategy launched in 2022 is genuinely reducing violence over time and restoring the authority of the state.
The benchmarks that would settle the argument
Political messaging can showcase progress. The ground imposes a different demand: lasting safety for ordinary people.
If the JNIM’s claims at Silmossin are confirmed, they would mark another sign of fragility at forward positions. But even without confirmation, the mounting claims against Burkinabè positions raise a fair question: why do some areas remain so hard to secure despite more troops, more equipment and more resources poured into counter-terrorism?
That is where any real audit of Traoré’s security record belongs. The debate should move past slogans, footage of military operations and declarations of victory, and focus on measurable indicators: territory held securely, attacks on civilians, military losses, freedom of movement, the return of displaced people, the functioning of public services and the ability of national forces to keep the positions they retake.
Without transparent data to track those elements, the gap between the official narrative and what people experience will keep feeding doubt. And in a war against armed groups, it is not slogans that decide the argument it is durable results on the ground.
By Ousmane Tandja — Senior correspondent
