In a late-September interview aired on BF1 TV, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the transitional president of Burkina Faso, ruled out any return to normal diplomatic ties with France, using unusually blunt language to criticise Paris. The statement is the latest in a political line the regime has followed since seizing power in September 2022: gradually breaking with the former French partner and steering Burkinabè diplomacy towards new allies, Russia foremost among them.
A decisive break that does not, on its own, guarantee independence
Since taking power, Ibrahim Traoré has repeatedly voiced hostility towards France, while relations between Ouagadougou and Paris have deteriorated sharply. The withdrawal of French forces, the departure of diplomats and the questioning of several forms of cooperation have marked this rupture. At the same time, the Burkinabè authorities have strengthened ties with Moscow and consolidated their alignment with Mali and Niger within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Presented by the authorities as a reconquest of national sovereignty, this diplomatic reorientation deserves scrutiny beyond political rhetoric. A sovereign state is free to choose its partners, but those choices must allow it to preserve its decision-making autonomy, strengthen national capacities and durably improve living conditions for its people.
The central question is therefore this: has Burkina Faso genuinely freed itself from external influence, or has it simply replaced one historic partner with another whose interests do not necessarily coincide with its own?
Rejecting France has become a central element of Ibrahim Traoré’s political discourse. The stance resonates with part of the population, shaped by a long history of unbalanced relations with the former colonial power and by frustrations over the results of past cooperation.
Yet denouncing French influence is not, in itself, a complete sovereignty policy. Breaking with one partner does not automatically mean becoming independent of all external influence. True sovereignty is also measured by a country’s ability to define its own priorities, diversify its partnerships, negotiate balanced agreements and refuse pressure, whatever its origin.
By presenting the break with Paris as major proof of national emancipation, the Burkinabè authorities risk reducing a complex issue to a rivalry between two foreign powers. France becomes the symbol of past dependence, while Russia is presented as the solution to that dependence.
That reading deserves nuance. No foreign partner Western, Russian, Chinese or from any other region bases its foreign policy exclusively on defending a third country’s interests. States defend their own strategic, economic, military and diplomatic interests first.
Russia is no exception to that rule.
Russia: a strategic ally, but not a selfless partner
The rapprochement between Ouagadougou and Moscow is one of the most visible changes in Burkinabè foreign policy since Ibrahim Traoré came to power. Security cooperation occupies an important place in this new direction, as Burkina Faso faces persistent insecurity linked to armed terrorist groups.
For the Burkinabè authorities, diversifying military partners can be a way to strengthen national capacities and move away from cooperation deemed insufficient with France. That choice falls within Burkina Faso’s sovereign right.
However, the question should not be whether Russia is preferable to France on principle, but rather what Burkina Faso concretely obtains from this new relationship.
What are each side’s commitments? What are the financial, military or economic counterparts? How long do the agreements last? What guarantees frame foreign partners’ interventions? And above all, to what extent does this cooperation durably strengthen the Burkinabè army’s own capacities?
These questions are essential. Military cooperation can provide operational support, equipment or technical expertise. But it does not automatically guarantee a lasting improvement in the security situation. Its effectiveness must be assessed on verifiable results: protection of populations, securing of road routes, return of displaced people and the ability of public services to function in areas affected by violence.
It would therefore be premature to treat the rapprochement with Moscow alone as proof of strategic success. Conversely, it would be just as excessive to conclude, without examining the agreements and results, that Russia dictates all decisions of the Burkinabè authorities.
The real issue is whether this partnership increases Burkina Faso’s decision-making capacity or creates new forms of dependence.
Changing partners does not necessarily mean changing the system of dependence
One paradox of Ibrahim Traoré’s policy lies in how sovereignty is presented in public debate. The authorities claim they want to free Burkina Faso from Western influence, but that ambition cannot be assessed solely through declarations against France or rapprochements with Moscow.
Sovereignty is not limited to the choice of military partners. It also concerns control over natural resources, budgetary policy, economic independence, industrial capacity, food security and the freedom to negotiate with foreign investors.
A country can break with a former partner power while remaining dependent on other actors for its military equipment, technologies, financing or certain commercial outlets. That dependence is not necessarily synonymous with submission, since international relations often rest on interdependence. It becomes problematic, however, when alternative options are limited and the country struggles to defend its own priorities.
That is why Burkina Faso must be judged on its ability to genuinely diversify its relations, develop national skills and negotiate transparent partnerships.
If Russia becomes an indispensable partner in certain areas, without the country having credible alternatives, the risk would then be the emergence of a new dependence, even if it comes under a different political discourse.
The point is not to claim that Moscow controls Ibrahim Traoré’s decisions, for lack of evidence to support such a conclusion. It is rather to recall an obvious fact of international relations: a foreign partner, however politically close, pursues its own interests and cannot be considered selfless on principle.
The AES: a sovereignty ambition that must also prove itself
The rapprochement between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, united within the Alliance of Sahel States, is part of this desire to redefine regional balances of power. The three countries highlight their sovereignty, their willingness to coordinate policies and their ambition to strengthen their autonomy vis-à-vis external partners.
In principle, regional cooperation can be an important lever. It can facilitate the pooling of defence resources, intelligence coordination, trade and the search for common solutions to Sahel challenges.
But a political alliance does not, on its own, guarantee the effectiveness of collective action. It must demonstrate its ability to produce concrete results for populations.
On the security front, the persistence of attacks, population displacements and difficulties encountered in certain localities require a rigorous evaluation of the strategies adopted. The situation cannot be assessed solely through official statements or talk of territorial reconquest. It requires verifiable data, comparison over time and particular attention to the situation of civilians.
On the economic front, the ambition of regional integration must also translate into smoother trade, suitable infrastructure and mechanisms to support producers, traders and businesses.
Finally, the sovereignty claimed by the AES should also manifest itself in the ability of its members to maintain diversified relations with several partners, without turning their opposition to certain powers into the exclusive guiding principle of their diplomacy.
A sovereign alliance is not one that simply changes camps, but one that retains the freedom to choose, to negotiate and, if necessary, to say no to its own allies.
Political sovereignty cannot make people forget the results they expect
Beyond diplomatic questions, the debate on sovereignty must be placed back in the daily lives of Burkinabè people.
For populations facing insecurity, displacement, economic hardship or limited access to certain public services, the essential question remains results.
The break with France may represent an assumed political choice. The rapprochement with Russia may also meet strategic objectives. But these decisions cannot exempt the authorities from accounting for their effectiveness.
The safety of people, continuity of public services, access to healthcare and education, job opportunities and protection of economic activities are all indicators for evaluating a government’s action.
It would therefore be insufficient to measure the success of Ibrahim Traoré’s policy by the number of hostile statements towards Paris, symbols of diplomatic rupture or the multiplication of meetings with Russian officials.
Results must be examined on the ground, using reliable and independent indicators.
Sovereignty cannot be merely a diplomatic posture. It must translate into an increased capacity of the state to protect its citizens, finance its priorities and meet the needs of its population.
The real test: Burkina Faso’s freedom of decision
By rejecting any normalisation with France, Ibrahim Traoré confirms his choice of a lasting political break with Paris. But this orientation raises a fundamental question about the very conception of sovereignty defended by his regime.
A truly independent country must be able to choose its partners without submitting to their demands, maintain relations with several powers and defend its interests without being trapped by its alliances.
France has its interests. Russia has its own. Other powers also pursue their own objectives. No diplomatic rapprochement should therefore be assessed solely on the basis of ideological proximity between leaders.
Burkina Faso has the right to diversify its partnerships and redefine its strategic priorities. But it is up to its authorities to demonstrate that this reorientation produces measurable results and effectively strengthens the country’s autonomy.
The question is not to systematically defend Paris against Moscow, nor to regard Russia as an adversary on principle. It is to know whether the choices made durably serve Burkina Faso’s interests.
For, at bottom, sovereignty is not proclaimed only in speeches against the former colonial power: it is verified in the ability to decide freely, negotiate without constraint and obtain concrete results for one’s people.
And it is precisely on this ground that Ibrahim Traoré’s policy must be evaluated, beyond slogans, alliances and diplomatic declarations.
By Aïcha Abdou — Journaliste / Rédacteur
