A pivotal moment unfolded in the early hours of 9 October 2026, when fighters from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) clashed violently near Tessit, close to the Burkina Faso border. The confrontation was not merely another skirmish between rival factions; it signalled a turning point in the Sahel’s security landscape, one that the military regimes of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger united under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) can no longer afford to ignore.
A breakthrough that exposes the limits of military strategy
Both JNIM and IS-S issued conflicting claims about the outcome. Sources aligned with JNIM said the rival group suffered heavy losses across multiple fronts, while IS-S supporters insisted they had defeated JNIM and seized new territory. Such contradictory accounts make it impossible to determine the true winner. Yet they reveal a deeper truth: armed groups remain capable of fighting for control of territory, and civilians continue to bear the brunt of the violence.
The Tessit clashes underscore a glaring contradiction in the security narrative of the AES regimes. Since taking power, the juntas have staked their legitimacy on reclaiming sovereignty and defeating terrorism. But the persistence of armed groups their ability to move, organise and battle each other raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the strategies deployed so far.
When promises meet reality on the ground
The core problem is not simply the existence of terrorist groups. It is the persistent failure of states to prevent them from establishing lasting footholds. While JNIM and IS-S contest positions around Tessit, local populations endure displacement, economic disruption and limited access to essential services. The promised restoration of order remains elusive.
AES authorities frequently point to foreign interference, accusing neighbouring countries of harbouring or facilitating armed groups. Such claims require verifiable evidence. The mere presence of terrorists on a nation’s soil does not automatically prove that its leaders support or shelter them. Still, the question remains: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups operate freely in areas where the state struggles to assert authority?
Sovereignty rhetoric versus battlefield outcomes
For the Sahel’s military rulers, the challenge is now to show that their strategic choices deliver tangible results. The shift in military partnerships, the departure of Western forces and the pivot toward Russia were presented as ways to regain control. Yet these moves alone have not eliminated armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and ongoing violence across the region show that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, effective administration, civilian protection and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A 2026 United Nations report documented continued activity by JNIM and IS-S, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between the two organisations over territorial control. This reality weakens narratives that blame external manoeuvres alone for security failures. Regional and cross-border factors exist, but they do not absolve any government of accountability for its own results.
The political stakes: power and the security pretext
The management of the terrorist threat raises a broader political question: how to prevent persistent insecurity from becoming a permanent justification for concentrating power and delaying a return to constitutional order?
It would be reckless to claim, without evidence, that AES leaders deliberately harbour or nurture terrorist groups to stay in power. Such an accusation demands concrete, independent and verifiable proof. However, it is legitimate to examine the political consequences of a situation where the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their rule.
The distinction is crucial: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as asserting that leaders themselves orchestrate it. The first is political analysis; the second requires proof.
What the people expect: results, not just explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims of JNIM and IS-S leave the outcome of the 9 October clashes uncertain. But that uncertainty does not change the fundamental issue: these organisations can still mount operations and challenge control of certain areas. For residents, the consequences are real. Insecurity hampers travel, disrupts economic activity and complicates access to basic services.
Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable progress on the ground. The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger face a simple demand: demonstrate the ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from entrenching themselves and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured solely by the partners one chooses or the foreign forces one expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory. As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, the AES authorities must answer a critical question: beyond rhetoric and accusations aimed abroad, what durable results can they show to guarantee the safety of their people?
By Aïcha Abdou — Journaliste / Rédacteur
